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1.  ST Introduction 
This chapter is divided into the following sections: “ST reference”, “TOE reference”, “TOE 
overview” and “TOE Description”.  
1.1  ST reference 
“NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A Security 
Target Lite, Rev. 1.2, NXP Semiconductors, 31 August 2009”.  
1.2  TOE reference 
NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A 
1.3  TOE overview 
1.3.1  Usage and major security functionality of the TOE  
The TOE is the IC hardware of the microcontroller chip family of NXP Secure Smart Card 
Controllers P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A. The TOE also comprises IC 
Dedicated Test Software for test purposes and IC Dedicated Support Software, both 
stored in the Test-ROM of the microcontroller. The Smart Card Controller hardware 
incorporates an 8-bit processing unit, volatile and non-volatile memories accessible via a 
Memory Management Unit, cryptographic coprocessors, other security components and 
two communication interfaces.  
The TOE also includes a Data Sheet, a document describing the Instruction Set and the 
Guidance Document. This documentation provides a description of the architecture and 
the secure configuration and usage of the IC hardware by the Security IC Embedded 
Software. 
The security functionality of the TOE is designed to act as an integral part of a complete 
security system in order to strengthen the design as a whole. Several security 
mechanisms are completely implemented in and controlled by the TOE. Other security 
mechanisms allow for configuration or even require handling of exceptions by the 
Security IC Embedded Software. With different CPU modes and a Memory Management 
Unit the TOE is intended to support multi-application projects. 
On-chip memories are ROM, EEPROM and RAM. The non-volatile EEPROM can be 
used as data or program memory. It contains high reliability cells, which guarantee data 
integrity. This is perfect for applications requiring non-volatile data storage and important 
for the use as memory for native programs. Security functionality protects the contents of 
all memories.  
A Security IC must provide high security in particular when being used in the banking and 
finance market or in electronic commerce applications. Hence the TOE shall 
·  maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of code and data stored in its memories 
and 
·  maintain the different CPU modes with the related capabilities for configuration and 
memory access and 
·  maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security 
functionality provided by the TOE. 
This is ensured by the construction of the TOE and its security functionality.   
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P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A basically provides a hardware platform for a 
smartcard with  
·  functionality to calculate the Data Encryption Standard (Triple-DES) with up to three 
keys, 
·  functionality to calculate the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with different key 
lengths, 
·  support for large integer arithmetic operations like multiplication, addition and logical 
operations, which is suitable for public key cryptography and elliptic curve 
cryptography, 
·  a Random Number Generator, 
·  memory management control, 
·  cyclic redundancy check (CRC) calculation, 
·  ISO/IEC 7816 contact interface with UART, 
·  contactless interface supporting MIFARE and ISO/IEC 14443 A. 
In addition, several security mechanisms are implemented to ensure proper operation as 
well as integrity and confidentiality of stored data. For example, this includes security 
mechanisms for memory protection and sensors, which allow operation under specified 
conditions only. 
Note:  Large integer arithmetic operations are intended to be used for calculation 
of asymmetric cryptographic algorithms. Any asymmetric cryptographic 
algorithm utilising the support for large integer arithmetic operations has to 
be implemented in Security IC Embedded Software. Thus, the support for 
large integer arithmetic operations itself does not provide security 
functionality like cryptographic support. The Security IC Embedded 
Software implementing an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm is not 
included in this evaluation. Nevertheless the support for large integer 
arithmetic operations is part of the Security IC and therefore a security 
relevant component of the TOE, that must resist to the attacks mentioned in 
this Security Target and that must operate correctly as specified in the Data 
Sheet. The same scope of evaluation is applied to the CRC calculation.  
1.3.2  TOE type  
The TOE is the family of NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers P5CD016/021/041V1A and 
P5Cx081V1A. The TOE includes the IC hardware, IC Designer/Manufacturer proprietary 
IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support Software.  
The TOE is delivered in a module, inlay or package, or as a sawn wafer.  
1.3.3  Required non-TOE hardware/software/firmware  
None  
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1.4  TOE Description 
1.4.1  Physical Scope of TOE 
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A is manufactured in an advanced CMOS 
process. A block diagram is depicted in Fig 1. 
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Fig 1.  Block Diagram of P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A  
 
The TOE consists of the IC hardware and the IC Dedicated Software as composed of IC 
Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support Software. All other software is called 
Security IC Embedded Software and is not part of the TOE. The following table lists the 
TOE components.  
TOE components 
Table 1.  Components of the TOE 
Type  Name  Release  Date  Form of delivery 
IC 
Hardware 
NXP Secure Smart Card 
Controllers 
P5CD016/021/041V1A and 
P5Cx081V1A  
V1A  T046B_20090210
.gds2 
Wafer, modules 
and packages (dice 
include reference 
T046B) 
IC 
Dedicated 
Test 
Software 
Test-ROM Software   87  16 January 2009  Test-ROM on the 
chip, tmfos_87.lst  
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Type  Name  Release  Date  Form of delivery 
Boot-ROM Software   87  16 January 2009  Test-ROM on the 
chip, tmfos_87.lst 
IC 
Dedicated 
Support 
Software  MIFARE Operating System   87  16 January 2009  Test-ROM on the 
chip, tmfos_87.lst 
Document  Data Sheet P5CD016/021/041 
and P5Cx081 family, Secure 
dual interface and contact PKI 
smart card controller 
    Electronic 
document 
Document  Instruction Set, SmartMX-
Family, Secure and PKI Smart 
Card Controller 
1.1  4 July 2006  Electronic 
document 
Document  Guidance, Delivery and 
Operation Manual NXP Secure 
Smartcard Controllers 
P5CD016/021/041 and 
P5Cx081 
    Electronic 
document 
 
1.4.1.1  Evaluated hardware configurations 
Six major configuration options are present, which are denoted by product names 
P5CD016V1A, P5CD021V1A, P5CD041V1A, P5CD081V1A, P5CC081V1A and 
P5CN081V1A. All of them are equipped with an EEPROM of 80 kBytes and both, the 
ISO/IEC 7816 contact interface and the ISO/IEC 14443 contactless interface. Their major 
differences are related to availability of EEPROM space and the contactless interface as 
detailed below.  
The minor configuration options of all major configurations are described in 
subsection 1.4.1.2.  
Major configuration P5CD016V1A 
P5CD016V1A supports all minor configuration options presented in subsection 1.4.1.2. 
Its major differences to other configurations are as follows.  
·  The EEPROM space available to the Security IC Embedded Software is reduced to 
16 kBytes minus 256 Bytes, which are reserved for Security Rows (128 Bytes) and 
configuration data (128 Bytes).  
·  The contactless interface is enabled and configured for contactless communication 
according to ISO/IEC 14443 A in [22] and [23].  
Major configuration P5CD021V1A 
P5CD021V1A supports all minor configuration options presented in subsection 1.4.1.2. 
Its major differences to other configurations are as follows.  
·  The EEPROM space available to the Security IC Embedded Software is reduced to 
20 kBytes minus 256 Bytes, which are reserved for Security Rows (128 Bytes) and 
configuration data (128 Bytes).  
·  The contactless interface is enabled and configured for contactless communication 
according to ISO/IEC 14443 A in [22] and [23].  
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Major configuration P5CD041V1A 
P5CD041V1A supports all minor configuration options presented in subsection 1.4.1.2. 
Its major differences to other configurations are as follows.  
·  The EEPROM space available to the Security IC Embedded Software is reduced to 
40 kBytes minus 256 Bytes, which are reserved for Security Rows (128 Bytes) and 
configuration data (128 Bytes).  
·  The contactless interface is enabled and configured for contactless communication 
according to ISO/IEC 14443 A in [22] and [23]. 
Major configuration P5CD081V1A  
P5CD081V1A supports all minor configuration options presented in subsection 1.4.1.2. 
Its major differences to other configurations are as follows.  
·  The physically implemented EEPROM of 80 kBytes is available to the Security IC 
Embedded Software except for 256 Bytes, which are reserved for Security Rows 
(128 Bytes) and configuration data of the manufacturer (128 Bytes).  
·  The contactless interface is enabled and configured for contactless communication 
according to ISO14443 A in [22] and [23].  
Major configuration P5CC081V1A  
P5CC081V1A supports all minor configuration options presented in subsection 1.4.1.2. 
Its major differences to other configurations are as follows.  
·  The physically implemented EEPROM of 80 kBytes is available to the Security IC 
Embedded Software except for 256 Bytes, which are reserved for Security Rows 
(128 Bytes) and configuration data (128 Bytes).  
·  The contactless interface is disabled.  
Major configuration P5CN081V1A  
P5CN081V1A supports all minor configuration options presented in subsection 1.4.1.2. 
Its major differences to other configurations are as follows.  
·  The physically implemented EEPROM of 80 kBytes is available to the Security IC 
Embedded Software except for 256 Bytes, which are reserved for Security Rows 
(128 Bytes) and configuration data (128 Bytes).  
·  The contactless interface is enabled and configured in S²C mode. The TOE now can 
be used for Near Field Communication (NFC) [24], for which an additional NFC 
helper IC is connected to IO3/SIGIN and LB/SIGOUT. However, it is possible that the 
TOE is powered in an appropriate electrical field when an antenna is connected to 
LA and LB. Pad I/O3 is connected to the NFC helper IC and can not be used for 
contact communication according to ISO 7816.  
1.4.1.2  Common minor configuration options 
The following minor configuration options can be selected by the customer via order 
entry forms.  
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Table 2.  Evaluated minor configuration options 
Name  Values  Description 
EDATASCALE  10h up to FFh   This value determines the size of the memory area 
available for the extended stack pointer. Refer to 
section 10.5 of [8].  
Card Disable 
Function 
Yes or No  When the Card Disable Function is enabled, the TOE 
can be locked completely. Once set by the Security IC 
Embedded Software, the execution of the Security IC 
Embedded Software is inhibited after the next reset. 
Refer to section 29.4 of [8]. 
Block ROM read 
instructions 
executed from 
EEPROM 
Yes or No  Instructions executed from EEPROM are allowed or 
not to read ROM contents. Refer to section 10.1.1.9 
of [8].  
Inverse EEPROM 
Error Correction 
Yes or No  If inverse error correction is activated the detection 
probability of fault injections to the EEPROM can be 
increased. Refer to section 10.9.9 of [8]. 
128 Byte Page 
Mode 
Yes or No  In the 128 Byte Page Mode up to 128 Bytes of 
EEPROM can be programmed simultaneously, 
instead of up to 64 Bytes. Refer to section 10.9.1 of 
[8]. 
MIFARE Emulation  A, B1 or B4  Different MIFARE configurations refer to chapter 21 of 
[8]. 
UID in MIFARE 
Emulation A 
Single or Double  The size of the UID can be 4 bytes (Single UID) or 7 
bytes (Double UID). Refer to section 11.1.1 of [8]. 
Contactless 
communication 
protocol 
(i) “proprietary 
protocol (compliant 
to ISO 14443 part 
3)”; 
(ii) “T=CL protocol 
(compliant to ISO 
14443 part 3 and 
part 4)” 
Refer to section 21 of [8]. 
Maximum CIU 
Baudrate 
106, 212, 424 or 
848 kBaud 
Defines the maximum available baudrate of the 
contactless interface. Refer to section 21 of [8]. 
Extended Voltage 
Class B activated 
Yes or No  If Extended Voltage Class B is activated, the usable 
"3V supply voltage range" is extended to lower values 
than the minimum Class B supply voltage 2.7 V, and 
Class C operation is not supported.  
“Class BE” supply voltage range: 2.2 V ￿ VDD ￿ 3.3 V. 
Refer to sections 34.1.3, 35.2, 29.2.2, 5 and 33 of [8].  
Voltage Class C 
operation activated 
Yes or No  If Voltage Class C is activated, supply voltage range 
is: 1.62 V ￿ VDD ￿ 1.98 V. 
Refer to sections 34.1.3, 35.2, 29.2.2, 5 and 33 of [8].  
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Name  Values  Description 
Requested LA/LB 
input capacitance 
17 pF or 69 pF  Additional capacitance (2x26 pF) between LA/LB 
required to meet resonance frequency at ID1/2 
operation. 
Simultaneous 
Operation of 
ISO/IEC 7816 and 
ISO/IEC 14443 
applications 
Yes or No  Disables the Low Frequency Sensor to allow parallel 
operation via contact and contactless interfaces. The 
Low Frequency Sensor is disabled only when the 
CPU is free-running or runs at an internal clock. 
The values of all options listed in Table 2 can be chosen independently. 
The Order Entry Forms [11], [12], [13], [14], [15] and [16] contain a further option, which 
must be selected with a fixed value:  
·  The option “Allow execution from RAM” must be selected with “No”. 
1.4.1.3  Evaluated package types 
A number of package types is supported for each major configuration of the TOE. The 
commercial types are named according to the following format.  
·  P5CD016pp/T1Arrffz for major configuration P5CD016V1A  
·  P5CD021pp/T1Arrffz for major configuration P5CD021V1A  
·  P5CD041pp/T1Arrffz for major configuration P5CD041V1A  
·  P5CD081pp/T1Arrffz for major configuration P5CD081V1A  
·  P5CC081pp/T1Arrffz for major configuration P5CC081V1A  
·  P5CN081pp/T1Arrffz for major configuration P5CN081V1A  
The commercial type name of each major configuration varies with the package type as 
indicated by the variable pp, - and with the Security IC Embedded Software as indicated 
by the variables rr, ff and z. The variables are replaced according to the rules in Table 3.  
Table 3.  Variable definitions for commercial type names 
Variable  Definition 
pp  This is a two character identifier for the package type, e.g. “UA” for a sawn wafer of 
150µm thickness with electronically marked defects. The different types are defined 
in Table 4.  
rr  ROM code number, different for every Security IC Embedded Software 
ff  FabKey number, multiple keys are supported for each Security IC Embedded 
Software 
z  MIFARE Configuration (0=A, 1=B1, 4=B4) 
Table 4 depicts the package types, which are supported in this Security Target, and 
assigns these to the major configuration types. The two characters in each entry of the 
table stand for pp, and identify the package type. An empty cell means that the Security 
Target does not support the respective package type for the corresponding major 
configuration.  
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Table 4.  Supported commercial types 
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UA  UA  UA  UA  UA  UA  150µm sawn wafer, inkless 
UE  UE  UE  UE      75µm sawn wafer, inkless 
        X0  X0  PCM1.1 module  
        XS  XS  PCM1.1 module dual source  
        XD  XD  PCM1.1 silver module  
X0  X0  X0  X0      PDM1.1 module 
X1  X1  X1  X1      PDM1.1 plug-in module 
XD  XD  XD  XD      PDM1.1 silver module 
XE  XE  XE  XE      PDM1.1 plug-in silver module 
      XG      PDM1.1 silver module special bonding IO3  
A4    A4  A4      MOB4 module 
A6    A6  A6      MOB6 module 
    Ai  Ai     
Inlay  
(The letter ‘i” in “Ai” stands for a capital letter, 
which identifies both, the inlay type and the 
module type inside the inlay.)  
For example, the commercial type name “P5CD081A4/T1Arrffz” denotes a P5CD081V1A 
in a MOB4 module and “P5CD081UA/T1Arrffz” denotes a P5CC081V1A on a 150µm 
sawn wafer inkless, which means that the defect ICs are electronically marked. 
The package types do not influence the security functionality of the TOE. They only 
define which pads are connected in the package and for what purpose the chip can be 
used. Note that the security of the TOE is not dependent on which pad is connected or 
not – the connections just define how the product can be used. If the TOE is delivered as 
wafer the customer can choose the connection on his own. 
Security during development and production is ensured for all package types listed 
above, please refer to section 1.4.3. 
As already described above the complete resulting commercial type name is dependent 
on the customer software, i.e. the Security IC Embedded Software. Thus, a full 
commercial product name, which fits in the variable forms described in Table 4, 
determines an evaluated hardware, but gives no conclusion on the Security IC 
Embedded Software and whether it uses the proper hardware configuration as detailed in 
subsection 1.4.1.2. 
1.4.2  Logical Scope of TOE 
1.4.2.1  Hardware Description 
The CPU of P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A has an 8-bit architecture with an 
instruction set, that is extended from the 80C51 family instruction set. The first and in 
some cases the second byte of an instruction are used for operation encoding.  
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P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A distinguishes five CPU modes, which are 
summarised in the following table. 
Table 5.  CPU modes of the TOE 
Super System Mode     
Boot Mode  Test Mode  MIFARE Mode  System Mode  User Mode 
 
Boot Mode, Test Mode and MIFARE Mode are sub-modes of the so-called Super System 
Mode. These three modes are not available to the Security IC Embedded Software, they 
are reserved for the IC Dedicated Software. The IC Dedicated Software is composed of 
the Boot-ROM Software, the Test-ROM Software and the MIFARE Operating System as 
introduced in section 1.4.1. The three software components are mapped one-to-one to 
the three modes: In Boot Mode the TOE executes the Boot-ROM Software, in Test Mode 
the TOE executes the Test-ROM Software and in MIFARE Mode the TOE executes the 
MIFARE Operating System. Please note that the Super System Mode is not a mode on 
its own: When the TOE is in Super System Mode, it is always either in Boot Mode, Test 
Mode or MIFARE Mode, depending on the settings of an internal register, which is not 
available to the Security IC Embedded Software.  
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A is able to control two different logical phases. 
After production of the IC hardware every start-up or reset completes with Test Mode and 
execution of the Test-ROM Software. The Test Mode is disabled at the end of the 
production test. Afterwards, every start-up or reset ends up in System Mode and 
execution of the Security IC Embedded Software.  
System Mode and User Mode are available to the developer of the Security IC 
Embedded Software. The System Mode provides unlimited access to the hardware 
components. In User Mode the access is restricted to the CPU and specific Special 
Function Registers. Access rights to hardware components for software running in User 
Mode can be granted by software running in System Mode. The hardware components 
are controlled by the Security IC Embedded Software via Special Function Registers. 
Special Function Registers are interrelated to the the activities of the CPU, the Memory 
Management Unit, interrupt control, I/O configuration, EEPROM, timers, UART, the 
contactless interface and the coprocessors.  
Communication with P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A can be established via the 
contact interface through UART or direct usage of the I/O ports. Contactless 
communication is done via the contactless interface unit (CIU) compatible to MIFARE 
and ISO/IEC 14443. P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A provides two types of 
interrupts: (i) exception interrupts, called “exception” in the following and (ii) event 
interrupts, called “interrupts” in the following. Exceptions and interrupts each force a jump 
to a specific fixed vector address in the ROM. Any exception and interrupt can therefore 
be controlled and guided by a specific part of the Security IC Embedded Software. In 
conjunction with the jump to a specific fixed vector address the IC hardware always 
enables a pre-defined CPU mode, which is either System Mode or User Mode. In 
addition, the P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A provides eight configuration 
vectors (CVEC) and 32 system call vectors (SVEC). These vectors have to be explicitly 
called by the Security IC Embedded Software. A jump to a configuration vector forces 
MIFARE Mode, a jump to a system call vector forces System Mode. 
Special hardware protects and separates the CPU modes from each other in particular 
consideration of Boot Mode and Test Mode.   
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P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A incorporates 288 kBytes of ROM, 7680 Bytes 
of RAM and 80 kBytes of EEPROM. Access control to all three memory types is enforced 
by a Memory Management Unit. The Memory Management Unit partitions each memory 
into two parts: The ROM is partitioned in 264 kBytes Application-ROM and 24 kBytes 
Test-ROM. The EEPROM is partitioned depending on the configuration, 128 Bytes are 
always reserved for the manufacturer and either zero, one or four kBytes are additionally 
reserved for the MIFARE Operating System according to the MIFARE configurations A, 
B1 or B4. The RAM is also partitioned depending on the configuration, either 0 Byte for 
MIFARE configuration A and the whole 7680 Bytes for the application, or 128 Bytes for 
MIFARE configurations B1 or B4 and the remaining 7552 Bytes for the application. Note 
that the ROM size is displayed as 264 kBytes in the block diagram in Fig 1 because only 
264 kBytes are available to the Security IC Embedded Software.  
In Test Mode the CPU has unrestricted access to the all memories. In Boot Mode and 
MIFARE Mode access is limited to the Test-ROM,  the 128 kBytes EEPROM plus its 
configured part of zero, one or four kBytes and the configured part of 0 or 128 kBytes 
RAM. All other parts of the memories are accessible in System Mode and User Mode, 
namely the Application-ROM and the larger parts of EEPROM and RAM. User Mode is 
further restricted by the Memory Management Unit, which can be configured in System 
Mode.  
The RAM, which is available to the Security IC Embedded Software, is further split in two 
parts. These are 5120 or 4992 Bytes general purpose RAM depending on the MIFARE 
configuration and 2560 Bytes FameXE RAM. Both parts are accessible to the CPU, but 
the FameXE coprocessor can only access the FameXE RAM. The FameXE can access 
the FameXE RAM without control of access rights by the Memory Management Unit. 
Since the Memory Management Unit does not control accesses of the FameXE, software 
which has access to the FameXE implicitly has access to the FameXE RAM. This also 
holds for the EEPROM, which is available to the Security IC Embedded Software. 
FameXE accesses to this part of the EEPROM are not controlled by the Memory 
Management Unit, i.e. software, which has access to the FameXE, implicitly has access 
to this part of the EEPROM.  
The Triple-DES coprocessor supports single DES and Triple-DES operations. Only 
Triple-DES is used in this evaluation, in 2-key or 3-key operation. The AES coprocessor 
supports AES operation with three different key lengths. The FameXE coprocessor 
supplies basic arithmetic functions to support implementation of asymmetric 
cryptographic algorithms by the Security IC Embedded Software. The random generator 
provides true random numbers without pseudo random calculation. 
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A operates with a single power supply of 1.8 V, 3 
V or 5 V nominal. The maximum external clock frequency is 10 MHz nominal. 
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A can be operated as well with an internal clock. 
This decreases the calculation time of security algorithms. P5CD016/021/041V1A and 
P5Cx081V1A provides power saving modes with reduced activity. These are named 
IDLE Mode and SLEEP Mode, of which the latter one includes CLOCK STOP Mode. 
The TOE protects secret data, which are stored to and operated by the TOE, against 
physical tampering. The security functionality of a Security IC is partially provided by the 
TOE, and completed by the Security IC Embedded Software. This causes dependencies 
between the security functionality of the TOE and the security functionality provided by 
the Security IC Embedded Software.  
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1.4.2.2  Software Description 
Operating system and applications of a Security IC are developed by the customers and 
included under the heading Security IC Embedded Software. The Security IC Embedded 
Software is stored in the Application-ROM and/or in the EEPROM and is not part of the 
TOE. The Security IC Embedded Software depends on the usage of the Security IC.  
The IC Dedicated Test Software, which is named Test-ROM Software, is stored to the 
Test-ROM and used by the manufacturer of the Security IC during production test. The 
test functionality is disabled before operational use of the Security IC by disabling the 
Test Mode of the CPU in hardware. The IC Dedicated Test Software is developed by 
NXP and embedded in the Test-ROM. The Test-ROM Software includes the test 
operating system, test routines for the various blocks of the circuitry, control flags for the 
status of the EEPROM’s Security Rows and shutdown functions to ensure that security 
relevant test operations can not be executed illegally after phase 3.  
The Dedicated Support Software is also stored to the Test-ROM and consists of two 
parts.  
·  The Boot-ROM Software, which is executed during start-up or reset of the TOE, i.e. 
each time when the TOE powers up or resets. It sets up the TOE and its basic 
configuration.  
·  The MIFARE Operating System, which provides MIFARE functionality to the Security 
IC Embedded Software. The MIFARE Operating System provides support for 
contactless communication. Please refer to [25] for more information. 
1.4.2.3  Documentation 
The data sheet “Data Sheet P5CD016/021/041 and P5Cx081 family, Secure dual 
interface and contact PKI smart card controller” [8] contains a functional description and 
guidelines for the use of the security functionality, as needed to develop Security IC 
Embedded Software. The instruction set of the CPU is described in “Instruction Set, 
SmartMX-Family, Secure and PKI Smart Card Controller” [9]. The manual “Guidance, 
Delivery and Operation Manual NXP Secure Smartcard Controllers P5CD016/021/041 
and P5Cx081” [10] describes aspects of the program interface and the use of 
programming techniques to improve the security. The whole documentation shall be 
used by the developer to develop the Security IC Embedded Software.  
1.4.3  Security during Development and Production 
The Security IC product life-cycle is scheduled in phases as introduced in the PP [6]. IC 
Development as well as IC Manufacturing and Testing, which are phases 2 and 3 of the 
life-cycle, are part of the evaluation. The Security IC is delivered at the end of phase 3 or 
after IC Packaging, which is phase 4 in the life-cycle, and then part of the evaluation as 
well. The development and production environment of the TOE ranges from phase 2 to 
TOE Delivery.  
With respect to Application Note 3 in [6] the TOE supports the authentic delivery using 
the FabKey feature. For details on this feature please refer to the data sheet in [8] and 
the manual in [10].  
During the design and the layout process only people involved in the specific 
development project for an IC have access to sensitive data. Different people are 
responsible for the design data and for customer related data. The security measures 
installed within NXP ensure a secure computer system and provide appropriate 
equipment for the different development tasks.  
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The verified layout data is provided by the developers of NXP Semiconductors, Business 
Line Identification directly to the wafer fab. The wafer fab generates and forwards the 
layout data related to the different photo masks to the manufacturer of the photo masks. 
The photo masks are generated off-site and verified against the design data of the 
development before the usage. Accountability and traceability are ensured among the 
wafer fab and the photo mask provider.  
The production of the wafers includes two different steps regarding the production flow. 
In the first step the wafers are produced with the fixed masks independent of the 
customer. After that step the wafers are completed with the customer specific mask and 
the remaining fixed masks. The computer tracking ensures control of the complete 
process including storage of the semi-finished wafers.  
The test process of every die is performed by a test centre of NXP. Delivery processes 
between the involved sites provide accountability and traceability of the produced wafers. 
NXP embeds the dice into modules, inlays or packages based on customer demand. 
Information about non-functional items is stored on magnetic/optical media enclosed with 
the delivery or the non-functional items are physically marked. In summary, the TOE can 
be delivered in four different forms, which are  
·  dice on wafers 
·  smartcard modules on a module reel  
·  inlays  
·  packaged devices in tubes or reels  
The availability of major configuration options of the TOE in package types is detailed in 
section 1.4.1.3. 
1.4.4  TOE Intended Usage 
The end-consumer environment of the TOE is phase 7 of the Security IC product life-
cycle in the PP [6]. In this phase the Security IC product is in usage by the end-
consumer. Its method of use now depends on the application. Security ICs are used to 
assure authorised conditional access in a wide range of applications. Examples are 
identity cards, Banking Cards, Pay-TV, Portable communication SIM cards, Health cards, 
Transportation cards. The end-user environment covers a wide spectrum of very different 
functions, thus making it difficult to monitor and avoid abuse of the TOE. The TOE is 
intended to be used in an insecure environment, which does not protect against threats. 
The device is developed for most high-end safeguarded applications, and is designed for 
embedding into chip cards according to ISO/IEC 7816 [20] and for contactless 
applications. Usually a Security IC (e.g. a smartcard) is assigned to a single individual 
only, but it may also be used by multiple applications in a multi-provider environment. 
Therefore the TOE might store and process secrets of several systems, which must be 
protected from each other. The TOE then must meet security requirements for each 
single security module. Secret data shall be used as input for calculation of 
authentication data, calculation of signatures and encryption of data and keys. 
In development and production environment of the TOE the Security IC Embedded 
Software developer and system integrators such as the terminal software developer may 
use samples of the TOE for their testing purposes. It is not intended that they are able to 
change the behaviour of the Security IC in another way than an end-consumer.  
The user environment of the TOE ranges from TOE delivery to phase 7 of the Security IC 
product life-cycle, and must be a controlled environment up to phase 6.   
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Note:  The phases from TOE Delivery to phase 7 of the Security IC Product life-
cycle are not part of the TOE construction process in the sense of this 
Security Target. Information about these phases is just included to describe 
how the TOE is used after its construction. Nevertheless such security 
functionality of the TOE, that is independent of the Security IC Embedded 
Software, is active at TOE Delivery and can not be disabled by the Security 
IC Embedded Software in the following phases. 
1.4.5  Interface of the TOE 
The electrical interface of the TOE are the pads to connect the lines power supply, reset 
input, clock input, ground, serial communication pads I/O1, I/O2 and I/O3 as well as two 
pads (called LA and LB) for the antenna of the contactless interface unit.  
The software interface of the TOE depends on the CPU mode. 
·  In the Boot Mode the Boot-ROM Software is executed which provides no interface. 
There is no possibility to interact with this software. 
·  In the Test Mode (used after production before delivery of the TOE) the logical 
interface that is visible on the electrical interface is defined by the IC Dedicated Test 
Software. This IC Dedicated Test Software comprises the test operating system and 
the package of test function calls stored in the Test-ROM. 
·  In the MIFARE Mode the MIFARE Operating System is executed by the CPU – only 
on request by the Security IC Embedded Software. 
·  In the System Mode and User Mode (used after TOE Delivery) the software interface 
is the set of instructions, the bits in the special function registers that are related to 
these modes and the physical address map of the CPU including memories. The 
access to the special function registers as well as to the memories depends on the 
CPU mode configured by the Security IC Embedded Software. 
Note:  The logical interface of the TOE that is visible on the electrical interface 
after TOE Delivery is based on the Security IC Embedded Software 
developed by the software developer. The identification and authentication 
of the user for the different CPU modes must be controlled by the Security 
IC Embedded Software. 
The chip surface can be seen as an interface of the TOE, too. This interface must be 
taken into account regarding environmental stress e.g. like temperature and in the case 
of an attack where the attacker manipulates the chip surface. 
Note:  An external voltage and timing supply as well as a data interface are 
necessary for the operation of the TOE. Beyond the physical behaviour the 
data interface is defined by the Security IC Embedded Software.  
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2.  Conformance Claims 
This chapter is divided into the following sections: “CC Conformance Claim", "Package 
claim", "PP claim", and "Conformance Claim Rationale”. 
2.1  CC Conformance Claim 
This Security Target claims to be conformant to version 3.1 of Common Criteria for 
Information Technology Security Evaluation according to   
·  “Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 1: 
Introduction and general model, Version 3.1, Revision 1, September 2006, CCMB-
2006-09-001” [1]  
·  “Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 2: Security 
functional requirements, Version 3.1, Revision 2, September 2007, CCMB-2007-09-
002” [2]  
·  “Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 3: Security 
Assurance Requirements, Version 3.1, Revision 2, September 2007, CCMB-2007-
09-003” [3]  
The following methodology will be used for the evaluation. 
·  “Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation CEM-99/045 
Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 2, September 2007, CCMB-
2007-09-004” [4]  
This Security Target claims to be CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 conformant. The 
extended Security Functional Requirements are defined in chapter 5.  
2.2  Package claim 
This Security Target claims conformance to the assurance package EAL 5 augmented. 
The augmentations to EAL5 are ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5. In addition, the Security 
Target is augmented using the component ASE_TSS.2, which is chosen to include 
architectural information on the security functionality of the TOE. 
Note:  The PP “Security IC Platform Protection Profile” [6] to which this Security 
Target claims conformance (refer to section 2.3) requires assurance level 
EAL4 augmented. The changes, which are needed for EAL5, are described 
in the relevant sections of this Security Target. 
The level of evaluation and the functionality of the TOE are chosen in order to allow the 
confirmation that the TOE is suitable for use within devices compliant with the German 
Digital Signature Law. 
2.3  PP claim 
This Security Target claims conformance to the Protection Profile (PP) 
“Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, registered and certified by 
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) under the reference BSI-PP-
0035” [6].  
Since the Security Target claims conformance to this PP [6], the concepts are used in the 
same sense. For the definition of terms please refer to the PP [6]. These terms also 
apply to this Security Target.   
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The TOE provides additional functionality, which is not covered in the PP [6]. In 
accordance with Application Note 4 of [6] this additional functionality is added using the 
policy “P.Add-Components” (see section 3.3 of this Security Target).  
2.4  Conformance Claim Rationale 
According to section 2.3 this Security Target claims conformance to the PP “Security IC 
Platform Protection Profile” [6].  
The TOE type defined in section 1.3.2 of this Security Target is a smartcard controller. 
This is consistent with the TOE definition for a Security IC in section 1.2.2 of [6].  
All sections of this Security Target, where security problem definition, objectives and 
security requirements are defined, clearly state which of these items are taken from the 
PP [6] and which are added in this Security Target. Therefore this is not repeated here. 
Moreover, all additionally stated items in this Security Target do not contradict the items 
included from the PP (see the respective sections in this document). The operations 
done for the SFRs taken from the PP [6] are also clearly indicated. 
The evaluation assurance level claimed for this target (EAL5+) is shown in section 6.2 to 
include respectively exceed the requirements claimed by the PP (EAL4+). 
These considerations show that the Security Target correctly claims conformance to the 
PP [6].   
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3.  Security Problem Definition 
This Security Target claims conformance to the PP “Security IC Platform Protection 
Profile”, [6]. Assets, threats, assumptions and organisational security policies are taken 
from the PP [6]. This chapter lists these assets, threats, assumptions and organisational 
security policies, and describes extensions to these elements in detail.  
The chapter is divided into the following sections: “Description of Assets", "Threats", 
"Organisational Security Policies", and "Assumptions". 
3.1  Description of Assets 
Since this Security Target claims conformance to the PP “Security IC Platform Protection 
Profile” [6] the assets defined in section 3.1 of [6] are applied here. These assets are 
cited here.  
The assets related to standard functionality are: 
·  the User Data, 
·  the Security IC Embedded Software, stored and in operation, 
·  the security services provided by the TOE for the Security IC Embedded Software. 
To be able to protect these assets the TOE shall protect its security functionality. 
Therefore critical information about the TOE shall be protected. Critical information 
includes: 
·  logical design data, physical design data, IC Dedicated Software, configuration data, 
·  Initialisation Data and Pre-personalisation Data, specific development aids, test and 
characterisation related data, material for software development support, 
photomasks. 
Note that the keys for the cryptographic coprocessors are seen as User Data. 
3.2  Threats 
Since this Security Target claims conformance to the PP “Security IC Platform Protection 
Profile” [6] the threats defined in section 3.2 of [6] are valid for this Security Target.  The 
following table lists the threats defined in the PP [6].  
Table 6.  Threats defined by the PP [6] 
Name  Title 
T.Leak-Inherent  Inherent Information Leakage 
T.Phys-Probing  Physical Probing 
T.Malfunction  Malfunction due to Environmental Stress 
T.Phys-Manipulation  Physical Manipulation 
T.Leak-Forced  Forced Information Leakage 
T.Abuse-Func  Abuse of Functionality 
T.RND  Deficiency of Random Numbers 
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Considering Application Note 5 in [6] there are no additional threats defined in this 
Security Target.  
3.3  Organisational Security Policies  
Since this Security Target claims conformance to the PP “Security IC Platform Protection 
Profile” [6] the policy P.Process-TOE “Protection during TOE Development and 
Production” in [6] is applied here as well. 
In accordance with Application Note 6 in [6] there is one additional policy defined in this 
Security Target as detailed below.  
The TOE provides specific security functionality, which can be used by the Security IC 
Embedded Software. In the following, specific security functionality is listed, which is not 
derived from threats identified for the TOE’s environment. It can only be decided in the 
context of the application against which threats the Security IC Embedded Software will 
use this specific security functionality.  
The IC Developer/Manufacturer therefore applies the policy “Additional Specific Security 
Components (P.Add-Components)” as specified below. 
P.Add-Components  Additional Specific Security Components 
  The TOE shall provide the following additional security 
functionality to the Security IC Embedded Software: 
·  Triple-DES encryption and decryption 
·  AES encryption and decryption 
·  Area based Memory Access Control 
·  Memory separation for different software parts (including IC 
Dedicated Software and Security IC Embedded Software) 
·  Special Function Register Access Control. 
3.4  Assumptions 
Since this Security Target claims conformance to the PP “Security IC Platform Protection 
Profile” [6] the assumptions defined in section 3.4 of [6] are valid for this Security Target. 
The following table lists these assumptions. 
Table 7.  Assumptions defined in the PP [6] 
Name  Title 
A.Process-Sec-IC  Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation 
A.Plat-Appl  Usage of Hardware Platform 
A.Resp-Appl  Treatment of User Data 
The following additional assumptions are added in this Security Target according to 
Application Notes 7 and 8 in [6]. 
A.Check-Init  Check of initialisation data by the Security IC Embedded 
Software 
  The Security IC Embedded Software must provide a function 
to check initialisation data. The data is defined by the 
customer and injected by the TOE Manufacturer into the non- 
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volatile memory to provide the possibility for TOE identification 
and for traceability. 
The following additional assumption considers specialised encryption hardware of the 
TOE.  
The developer of the Security IC Embedded Software must ensure the appropriate 
“Usage of Key-dependent Functions (A.Key-Function)” while developing this software in 
Phase 1 as specified below. 
A.Key-Function  Usage of Key-dependent Functions 
  Key-dependent functions (if any) shall be implemented in the 
Security IC Embedded Software in a way that they are not 
susceptible to leakage attacks (as described under T.Leak-
Inherent and T.Leak-Forced). 
  Note that here the routines which may compromise keys when 
being executed are part of the Security IC Embedded 
Software. In contrast to this the threats T.Leak-Inherent and 
T.Leak-Forced address (i) the cryptographic routines which 
are part of the TOE and (ii) the processing of User Data 
including cryptographic keys.  
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4.  Security Objectives 
This chapter contains the following sections: "Security Objectives for the TOE", "Security 
Objectives for the Security IC Embedded Software development Environment" "Security 
Objectives for the Operational Environment", and "Security Objectives Rationale". 
4.1  Security Objectives for the TOE 
The TOE shall provide the following security objectives, which are taken from the PP 
“Security IC Platform Protection Profile” [6].  
Table 8.  Security objectives defined in the PP [6] 
Name  Title 
O.Leak-Inherent  Protection against Inherent Information Leakage 
O.Phys-Probing  Protection against Physical Probing 
O.Malfunction  Protection against Malfunctions 
O.Phys-Manipulation  Protection against Physical Manipulation 
O.Leak-Forced  Protection against Forced Information Leakage 
O.Abuse-Func  Protection against Abuse of Functionality 
O.Identification  TOE Identification 
O.RND  Random Numbers 
 
Regarding the Application Notes 9 and 10 in [6] the following additional security 
objectives are defined based on additional functionality provided by the TOE as specified 
below. 
O.HW_DES3  Triple DES Functionality 
  The TOE shall provide the cryptographic functionality to 
calculate a Triple DES encryption and decryption to the 
Security IC Embedded Software. The TOE supports directly 
the calculation of Triple DES with up to three keys. 
  Note: The TOE will ensure the confidentiality of the User Data 
(and especially cryptographic keys) during Triple DES 
operation. This is supported by O.Leak-Inherent. 
O.HW_AES  AES Functionality 
  The TOE shall provide the cryptographic functionality to 
calculate an AES encryption and decryption to the Security IC 
Embedded Software. The TOE supports directly the 
calculation of AES with three different key lengths. 
  Note: The TOE will ensure the confidentiality of the User Data 
(and especially cryptographic keys) during AES operation. 
This is supported by O.Leak-Inherent.  
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O.MF_FW  MIFARE Firewall 
  The TOE shall provide separation between the “MIFARE 
Operating System” as part of the IC Dedicated Support 
Software and the Security IC Embedded Software. The 
separation shall comprise software execution and data 
access. 
O.MEM_ACCESS  Area based Memory Access Control 
  Access by processor instructions to memory areas is 
controlled by the TOE. The TOE decides based on the CPU 
mode (Boot Mode, Test Mode, MIFARE Mode, System Mode 
or User Mode) and the configuration of the Memory 
Management Unit if the requested type of access to the 
memory area addressed by the operands in the instruction is 
allowed. 
O.SFR_ACCESS  Special Function Register Access Control 
  The TOE shall provide access control to the Special Function 
Registers depending on the purpose of the Special Function 
Register or based on permissions associated to the memory 
area from which the CPU is currently executing code. The 
access control is used to restrict access to hardware 
components of the TOE. 
  The possibility to define access permissions to specialised 
hardware components of the TOE shall be restricted to code 
running in System Mode. 
4.2  Security Objectives for the Security IC Embedded Software 
development Environment 
In addition to the security objectives for the operational environment as required by CC 
Part 1 [1] the PP “Security IC Platform Protection Profile” [6] defines security objectives 
for the Security IC Embedded Software development environment which are listed below. 
Table 9.  Security objectives for the Security IC Embedded Software development 
environment, taken from the PP [6] 
Security objective  Description  Applies to phase... 
OE.Plat-Appl  Usage of Hardware Platform  Phase 1 
OE.Resp-Appl  Treatment of User Data  Phase 1 
 
Clarification of “Usage of Hardware Platform (OE.Plat-Appl)” 
The TOE supports cipher schemes as additional specific security functionality. If required 
the Security IC Embedded Software shall use these cryptographic services of the TOE 
and their interface as specified. When key-dependent functions implemented in the 
Security IC Embedded Software are just being executed, the Security IC Embedded 
Software must provide protection against disclosure of confidential data (User Data) 
stored and/or processed in the TOE by using the methods described under “Inherent 
Information Leakage (T.Leak-Inherent)” and “Forced Information Leakage (T.Leak-
Forced)“.  
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If the Random Number Generator is used for leakage countermeasures, cryptographic 
operations (e.g. key generation) or cryptographic protocols (e.g. challenge response) 
these random numbers must be tested appropriately. 
For multi-applications the Security IC Embedded Software (Operating System) can 
implement a memory management scheme based upon security functionality of the TOE 
to ensure the separation of applications. 
Clarification of “Treatment of User Data (OE.Resp-Appl)” 
By definition cipher or plain text data and cryptographic keys are User Data. The Security 
IC Embedded Software shall treat these data appropriately, use only proper secret keys 
(chosen from a large key space) as input for the cryptographic function of the TOE and 
use keys and functions appropriately in order to ensure the strength of cryptographic 
operation. 
This means that keys are treated as confidential as soon as they are generated. The 
keys must be unique with a very high probability, as well as cryptographically strong. For 
example, if asymmetric algorithms are used, it must be ensured that it is not possible to 
derive the private key from a related public key using the attacks defined in this Security 
Target. If keys are imported into the TOE and/or derived from other keys, quality and 
confidentiality must be maintained. This implies that appropriate key management has to 
be realised in the environment. 
The treatment of User Data is also required when a multi-application operating system is 
implemented as part of the Security IC Embedded Software on the TOE. In this case the 
multi-application operating system will not disclose security relevant user data of one 
application to another application when it is processed or stored on the TOE. 
4.3  Security Objectives for the Operational Environment 
The following security objectives for the operational environment are specified according 
to the PP “Security IC Platform Protection Profile” [6].  
Table 10.  Security objectives for the operational environment, taken from the PP [6] 
Security objective  Description  Applies to phase... 
OE.Process-Sec-IC  Protection during composite product 
manufacturing 
TOE delivery up to the end of 
phase 6 
 
Check of initialisation data 
The TOE provides specific functionality that requires the TOE Manufacturer to implement 
measures for the unique identification of the TOE. Therefore, OE.Check-Init is defined to 
allow a TOE specific implementation (refer also to A.Check-Init). 
OE.Check-Init  Check of initialisation data by the Security IC Embedded 
Software 
To ensure the receipt of the correct TOE, the Security IC 
Embedded Software shall check a sufficient part of the pre-
personalisation data. This shall include at least the FabKey 
Data that is agreed between the customer and the TOE 
Manufacturer.  
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4.4  Security Objectives Rationale 
Section 4.4 in the PP “Security IC Platform Protection Profile” [6] provides a rationale 
how the assumptions, threats, and organisational security policies are addressed by the 
objectives that are specified in the PP [6]. The following Table 11 reproduces the table in 
section 4.4 of [6].  
Table 11.  Security Objectives versus Assumptions, Threats or Policies 
Assumption, Threat or OSP  Security Objective  Notes 
A.Plat-Appl  OE.Plat-Appl  Phase 1 
A.Resp-Appl  OE.Resp-Appl  Phase 1 
P.Process-TOE  O.Identification  Phase 2 – 3 
A.Process-Sec—IC  OE.Process-Sec-IC  Phase 4 – 6 
T.Leak-Inherent  O.Leak-Inherent   
T.Phys-Probing  O.Phys-Probing   
T.Malfunction  O.Malfunction   
T.Phys-Manipulation  O.Phys-Manipulation   
T.Leak-Forced  O.Leak-Forced   
T.Abuse-Func  O.Abuse-Func   
T.RND  O.RND   
 
The following Table 12 provides the justification for the additional security objectives. 
They are in line with the security objectives of the PP [6] and supplement these 
according to the additional assumptions and organisational security policy. 
Table 12.  Additional Security Objectives versus Assumptions or Policies 
Assumption/Policy  Security Objective  Note 
P.Add-Components  O.HW_DES3 
O.HW_AES 
O.MF_FW 
O.MEM_ACCESS 
O.SFR_ACCESS 
 
A.Key-Function  OE.Plat-Appl 
OE.Resp-Appl 
Phase 1 
A.Check-Init  OE.Check-Init  Phase 1 and 
Phase 4 - 6 
 
The justification related to the policy “Additional Specific Security Components (P.Add-
Components)” is detailed below.   
The justification related to the security objectives O.HW_DES3, O.HW_AES, O.MF_FW, 
O.MEM_ACCESS and O.SFR_ACCESS is as follows. Since these objectives require the  
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TOE to implement exactly the same specific security functionality as required by P.Add-
Components, the organisational security policy is covered by the objectives. 
Nevertheless the security objectives O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction, 
O.Phys-Manipulation and O.Leak-Forced define how to implement the specific security 
functionality required by P.Add-Components. These security objectives are also valid for 
the additional specific security functionality since they must avert the related threats also 
for the components added related to the policy. 
The requirements for a multi-application platform necessitate the separation of users. 
Therefore it is volitional that most of the security functionality can not be influenced or 
used in User Mode. 
The justification related to the assumption A.Key-Function is as follows: 
·  Compared to [6] a clarification has been made for the security objective “Usage of 
Hardware Platform (OE.Plat-Appl)”: If required the Security IC Embedded Software 
shall use the cryptographic service of the TOE and its interface as specified. In 
addition, the Security IC Embedded Software (i) must implement operations on keys 
(if any) in such a manner that they do not disclose information about confidential data 
and (ii) must configure the memory management in a way that different applications 
are sufficiently separated. If the Security IC Embedded Software uses random 
numbers provided by the security service SS.RNG these random numbers must be 
tested as appropriate for the intended purpose. This addition ensures that the 
assumption A.Key-Function is still covered by the objective OE.Plat-Appl although 
additional functions are being supported according to P.Add-Components. 
·  Compared to [6] a clarification has been made for the security objective “Treatment 
of User Data (OE.Resp-Appl)”: By definition cipher or plain text data and 
cryptographic keys are User Data. So, the Security IC Embedded Software will 
protect such data if required and use keys and functions appropriately in order to 
ensure the strength of cryptographic operation. Quality and confidentiality must be 
maintained for keys that are imported and/or derived from other keys. This implies 
that appropriate key management has to be implemented in the environment. In 
addition, the treatment of User Data comprises the implementation of a multi-
application operating system that does not disclose security relevant User Data of 
one application to another one. These measures make sure that the assumption 
A.Key-Function is still covered by the security objective OE.Resp-Appl although 
additional functions are being supported according to P.Add-Components. 
The justification related to the assumption "Check of initialisation data by the Security IC 
Embedded Software (A.Check-Init)" is as follows: 
Since OE.Check-Init requires the Security IC Embedded Software developer to 
implement a function assumed in A.Check-Init, the assumption is covered by the 
objective. 
The justification of the additional policy and the additional assumptions show that they do 
not contradict to the rationale already given in the PP [6] for the assumptions, policy and 
threats defined there.  
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5.  Extended Components Definition 
This Security Target does not define extended components. 
Note that the PP “Security IC Platform Protection Profile” [6] defines extended security 
functional requirements in chapter 5, which are included in this Security Target.  
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6.  Security Requirements 
This chapter consists of the sections “Security Functional Requirements”, “Security 
Assurance Requirements” and “Security Requirements Rationale”. 
6.1  Security Functional Requirements 
The Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) of the TOE are presented in the following 
sections to support a better understanding of the combination of PP “Security IC Platform 
Protection Profile” [6] and Security Target. 
6.1.1  SFRs of the Protection Profile 
Table 13 below shows all SFRs, which are specified in the PP [6] (in the order of 
definition in the PP). Some of the SFRs are CC Part 2 extended and defined in the PP 
[6]. This is shown in the third column of the table. 
Table 13.  SFRs taken from the PP [6] 
SFR  Title  Defined in  
FRU_FLT.2  Limited fault tolerance  CC, Part 2 
FPT_FLS.1  Failure with preservation of secure state  CC, Part 2 
FMT_LIM.1  Limited capabilities  PP, Section 5.2 
FMT_LIM.2  Limited availability  PP, Section 5.2 
FAU_SAS.1  Audit storage  PP, Section 5.3 
FPT_PHP.3  Resistance to physical attack  CC, Part 2 
FDP_ITT.1  Basic internal transfer protection  CC, Part 2 
FPT_ITT.1  Basic internal TSF data transfer protection  CC, Part 2 
FDP_IFC.1  Subset information flow control  CC, Part 2 
FCS_RNG.1  Random number generation  PP, Section 5.1 
 
All operations except for the following assignments and selections are already performed 
in the PP [6]. 
For the SFR FAU_SAS.1 the PP [6] leaves the assignment operation open for the 
non-volatile memory type in which intialisation data, pre-personalisation data and/or other 
supplements for the Security IC Embedded Software are stored. This assignment 
operation is filled in by the following statement. Note that the assignment operations for 
the list of subjects and the list of audit information have already been filled in by the PP 
[6]. 
FAU_SAS.1  Audit storage 
Hierarchical to:  No other components. 
Dependencies:  No dependencies. 
FAU_SAS.1.1  The TSF shall provide the test process before TOE Delivery 
1 
with the capability to store the Initialisation Data and/or Pre-
 
1   [assignment: list of subjects]  
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personalisation Data and/or supplements of the Security IC 
Embedded Software 
2 in the EEPROM 
3. 
For FCS_RNG.1.1 the PP [6] partially fills in the assignment for the security capabilities 
of the RNG by requiring a total failure test of the random source and adds an assignment 
operation for additional security capabilities of the RNG. 
In addition, for FCS_RNG.1.2 the PP [6] partially fills in the assignment operation for the 
defined quality metric for the random numbers by replacing it by a selection and 
assignment operation.  
For the above operations the original operations defined in chapter 5 of the PP [6] have 
been replaced by the open operations of the partially filled in operations in the statement 
of the security requirements in chapter 6 of [6] for better readability. Note that the 
selection operation for the RNG type has already been filled in by the PP [6]. 
FCS_RNG.1  Random number generation 
Hierarchical to:  No other components. 
FCS_RNG.1.1  The TSF shall provide a physical
 4 Random Number 
Generator that implements total failure test of the random 
source and none
 5. 
FCS_RNG.1.2  The TSF shall provide random numbers that meet 
independent bits with Shannon entropy of 7.976 bits per 
octet
6. 
Dependencies:  No dependencies. 
Note:   Application Note 20 in [6] requires that the Security Target 
specifies for the security capabilities in FCS_RNG.1.1 how the 
results of the total failure test of the random source are 
provided to the Security IC Embedded Software. The TOE 
features a hardware test which is called by the Security IC 
Embedded Software. The results of the internal test sequence 
are provided to the Security IC Embedded Software as a pass 
or fail criterion by means of a special function register. 
  The entropy of the random number is measured by the 
Shannon-Entropy as follows: 
￿
=
× - =
255
0
2 log
i
i i p p E , where i p  is the probability that the 
byte  ) , , , ( 0 6 7 b b b ￿  is equal to i  as binary number. Here 
term “bit” means measure of the Shannon-Entropy. 
  The value “7.976” is assigned due to the requirements of  
“AIS31”, [5]. 
By this, all assignment/selection operations are performed. This Security Target does not 
perform any other/further operations than stated in the PP [6]. 
 
2   [assignment: list of audit information] 
3  [assignment: type of persistent memory] 
4  [selection: physical, non-physical true, deterministic, hybrid] 
5  [assignment: list of additional security capabilities] 
6  [selection: independent bits with Shannon entropy of 7.976 bits per octet, Min-entropy of 7.95 bit per 
octet, [assignment: other comparable quality metric]]  
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Considering the Application Note 12 of [6] in the following paragraphs the additional 
functions for cryptographic support and access control are defined. These SFRs are not 
required in the PP [6]. 
As required by the Application Note 14 of [6] the secure state is described in 
section 7.2.1 in the rationale for SF.OPC.  
Regarding the Application Note 15 of [6] an additional generation of audit is not defined 
for “Limited fault tolerance” (FRU_FLT.2) and “Failure with preservation of secure state” 
(FPT_FLS.1). 
As required by the Application Note 18 of [6] the automatic response of the TOE is 
described in section 7.2.1 in the rationale for SF.PHY. 
6.1.2  Additional SFRs regarding cryptographic functionality 
The (DES coprocessor of the) TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation 
(FCS_COP.1[DES])” as specified below. 
FCS_COP.1[DES]  Cryptographic operation 
Hierarchical to:  No other components.  
FCS_COP.1.1  The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption 
7 in 
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Triple 
Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) 
8 and cryptographic key 
sizes of 112 or 168 bit 
9 that meet the following list of 
standards 
10: 
  FIPS PUB 46-3 FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING 
STANDARDS PUBLICATION DATA ENCRYPTION 
STANDARD (DES) Reaffirmed 1999 October 25, keying 
options 1 and 2. 
Dependencies:  [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or 
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or 
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation], 
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction. 
The (AES coprocessor of the) TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation 
(FCS_COP.1[AES])” as specified below. 
FCS_COP.1[AES]  Cryptographic operation 
Hierarchical to:  No other components.  
FCS_COP.1.1  The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption 
11 in 
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm 
12 and 
cryptographic key sizes of 128, 192 or 256 bit 
13 that meet the 
following list of standards 
14: 
 
7  [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] 
8  [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] 
9   [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] 
10  [assignment: list of standards] 
11  [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] 
12  [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] 
13   [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] 
14  [assignment: list of standards]  
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  FIPS PUB 197 FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING 
STANDARDS PUBLICATION, ADVANCED ENCRYPTION 
STANDARD (AES), National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, 2001 November 26. 
Dependencies:  [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or 
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or 
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation], 
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction. 
6.1.3  Additional SFRs regarding access control 
Access Control Policy 
The hardware shall provide different CPU modes to the IC Dedicated Software and 
Security IC Embedded Software. The TOE shall separate IC Dedicated Software and 
Security IC Embedded Software from each other by both, partitioning of memory and 
different CPU modes. The management of access to code and data as well as the 
configuration of the hardware shall be performed each in a dedicated CPU mode. The 
hardware shall enforce a separation between different applications (i.e. parts of the 
Security IC Embedded Software) running on the TOE. An application shall not be able to 
access hardware components without explicitly granted permission.  
The following table provides an overview on the differences in the “xD”-configuration and 
the “xC”-configuration of the TOE. This must be considered for the following access 
control policy and the related Security Functional Requirements.  
Table 14.   Differences between TOE configurations with regard to the Access Control Policy 
￿
￿
￿
TOE major configurations 
P5CD016V1A, 
P5CD021V1A, 
P5CD041V1A, 
P5CD081V1A, 
P5CN081V1A 
TOE major configuration 
P5CC081V1A  
Remark 
Access to 
special area 
in the 
EEPROM 
depends on the MIFARE 
configuration 
fixed  described in detail below, 
function in general not 
influenced by the 
configuration 
Access to 
RAM 
depends on the MIFARE 
configuration 
completely accessible  described in detail below, 
function in general not 
influenced by the 
configuration 
MIFARE 
firewall for 
the RAM 
access 
configuration of the MIFARE 
firewall supports the 
separation between IC 
Dedicated Support Software 
and Security IC Embedded 
Software 
MIFARE firewall can be 
configured because the 
Special Function Registers 
are accessible as for 
P5CD016V1A, 
P5CD021V1A 
P5CD041V1A, 
P5CD081V1A and 
P5CN081V1A. System 
Mode and User Mode 
always have access to the 
RAM, but the configuration 
can allow access of the 
refer to the description of the 
MIFARE firewall below, 
function in general not 
influenced by the 
configuration  
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￿
￿
￿
TOE major configurations 
P5CD016V1A, 
P5CD021V1A, 
P5CD041V1A, 
P5CD081V1A, 
P5CN081V1A 
TOE major configuration 
P5CC081V1A  
Remark 
MIFARE Operating System 
to a RAM area. This 
configuration has no impact 
since the MIFARE Mode is 
disabled. 
MIFARE 
firewall for 
the Special 
Function 
Register 
access 
the configuration of the 
MIFARE firewall restricts the 
access of the MIFARE 
Operating System to the 
hardware related Special 
Function Registers 
MIFARE firewall can be 
configured because the 
Special Function Registers 
are accessible as for 
P5CD016V1A, 
P5CD021V1A 
P5CD041V1A, 
P5CD081V1A and 
P5CN081V1A, but has no 
impact since the MIFARE 
Mode is disabled. 
refer to the description of the 
MIFARE firewall below, 
function in general not 
influenced by the 
configuration 
supported 
CPU mode 
System Mode, User Mode 
and MIFARE Mode 
System Mode and User 
Mode. The change of these 
two modes to the MIFARE 
Mode is suppressed in this 
configuration 
If the MIFARE Mode is 
suppressed the related 
“lcall” commands (CVEC 
calls) do not force a change 
of the CPU mode. Thereby 
they are executed as a 
normal “lcall” command. 
 
The Security Function Policy (SFP) Access Control Policy uses the following definitions.  
The subjects are  
·  The Security IC Embedded Software i.e. data in the memories of the TOE executed 
as instructions by the CPU 
·  The Test-ROM Software as IC Dedicated Test Software 
·  The Boot-ROM Software as part of the IC Dedicated Support Software 
·  The MIFARE Operating System as part of the IC Dedicated Support Software 
The objects are  
·  the memories consisting of 
-  ROM, which is partitioned into Test-ROM and Application-ROM, 
-  EEPROM, which is partitioned into two parts. For the ease of referencing the part 
reserved for the MIFARE Operating System is called MIFARE-EEPROM, the 
other part Application-EEPROM. 
-  RAM, which is partitioned into two parts. For the ease of referencing the part 
reserved for the MIFARE Operating System is called MIFARE-RAM, the other part 
Application-RAM.  
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-  the code and data in the Memory Segments defined by the Memory Management 
Unit in Application-ROM, Application-EEPROM and Application-RAM. Note that 
this memory is a subset of the first three. 
·  the physical memory locations within the three memories that are used by the 
Memory Management Unit for the MMU Segment Table. 
·  the Special Function Registers consisting of 
-  Special Function Registers to configure the MMU segmentation. This group 
contains the registers that define the pointer to the MMU Segment Table. 
-  Special Function Registers related to system management, a number of Special 
Function Registers that are intended to be used for overall system management 
by the operating system. 
-  Special Function Registers to configure the MIFARE firewall. These Special 
Function Registers allow to modify the MIFARE firewall regarding data exchange 
and Special Function Register access control. 
-  Special Function Registers used by the MIFARE Operating System. The MIFARE 
Operating System uses a number of internal Special Function Registers. 
-  Special Function Registers related to testing. These Special Function Registers 
are reserved for testing purposes. 
-  Special Function Registers related to hardware components. These Special 
Function Registers are used to utilise hardware components like the coprocessors 
or the interrupt system. 
-  Special Function Registers related to general CPU functionality. This group 
contains e.g. the accumulator, stack pointer and data pointers. 
The memory operations are  
·  read data from the memory, 
·  write data into the memory and  
·  execute data in the memory. 
The Special Function Register operations are  
·  read data from a Special Function Register and 
·  write data into a Special Function Register. 
The security attributes are 
·  CPU mode: There are five CPU modes based on the configuration of the Special 
Function Register “Program Status Word High (PSWH)” and two internal bits defining 
whether the instruction is executed in Boot Mode, Test Mode, MIFARE Mode, 
System Mode or User Mode. 
·  The values of the Special Function Registers to configure the MMU segmentation 
and Special Function Registers related to system management. These groups 
contain the pointer to the MMU Segment Table and those relevant for the overall 
system management of the TOE, especially PSWH. 
·  MMU Segment Table: Configuration of the Memory Segments comprising access 
rights (read, write and execute), the virtual code memory base address of the first 
and last valid address, and the relocation offset to the physical memory location for 
each of the 64 possible Memory Segments. For every segment also the access 
rights to the Special Function Registers related to hardware components are defined.  
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·  The values of the Special Function Registers FWCTRLL, FWCTRLH, MXBASL, 
MXBASH, MXSZL and MXSZH belonging to the group Special Function Registers to 
configure the MIFARE firewall that define the access rights to the Special Function 
Registers related to hardware components for code executed in MIFARE Mode and 
the RAM area used for data exchange between IC Dedicated Support Software 
(MIFARE OS) and Security IC Embedded Software. 
In the following the term “code running” combined with a CPU mode (e.g. “code running 
in System Mode”) is used to name subjects. 
Note:  Use of a Memory Segment is disabled in case no access permissions are 
granted. It is not necessary to define all 64 possible Memory Segments, the 
Memory Management Unit is capable of managing an arbitrary number of 
segments up to the limit of 64.  
The amount of the partitioned memory for EEPROM and RAM depends on the 
configuration of the TOE. For P5CD016V1A, P5CD021V1A, P5CD041V1A, 
P5CD081V1A, and P5CN081V1A it depends on the MIFARE configuration A, B1 or B4, 
refer to section 1.4. 128 bytes of the EEPROM are always reserved for the manufacturer.  
The TOE shall meet the requirements “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” as specified 
below. 
FDP_ACC.1[MEM]  Subset access control 
Hierarchical to:  No other components. 
FDP_ACC.1.1  The TSF shall enforce the Access Control Policy 
15 on all code 
running on the TOE, all memories and all memory 
operations 
16. 
Dependencies:  FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control 
Application Note:  The Access Control Policy shall be enforced by implementing 
a Memory Management Unit, which maps virtual addresses to 
physical addresses. The CPU always uses virtual addresses, 
which are mapped to physical addresses by the Memory 
Management Unit. Prior to accessing the respective memory 
address, the Memory Management Unit checks if the access 
is allowed. 
FDP_ACC.1[SFR]  Subset access control 
Hierarchical to:  No other components. 
FDP_ACC.1.1  The TSF shall enforce the Access Control Policy 
17 on all code 
running on the TOE, all Special Function Registers, and all 
Special Function Register operations 
18. 
Dependencies:  FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control 
Application Note:  The Access Control Policy shall be enforced by implementing 
hardware access control to each Special Function Register. 
For every access the CPU mode is used to determine if the 
 
15   [assignment: access control SFP] 
16   [assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the 
SFP] 
17   [assignment: access control SFP] 
18   [assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the 
SFP]  
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access shall be granted or denied. In addition, in User Mode 
and MIFARE Mode the access rights to the Special Function 
Registers related to hardware components are provided by 
the MMU Segment Table and the Special Function Registers 
to configure the MIFARE firewall. A denied read access 
returns “0” instead of the actual value, a denied write access 
is in fact ignored. The read and/or write access to a Special 
Function Register may be not allowed depending on the 
function of the register or on the CPU mode to enforce the 
access control policy or ensure a secure operation. 
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control 
(FDP_ACF.1)” as specified below. 
FDP_ACF.1[MEM]  Security attribute based access control 
Hierarchical to:  No other components. 
FDP_ACF.1.1  The TSF shall enforce the Access Control Policy 
19 to objects 
based on the following: all subjects and objects and the 
attributes CPU mode, the MMU Segment Table, the Special 
Function Registers to configure the MMU segmentation and 
the Special Function Registers related to system 
management 
20. 
FDP_ACF.1.2  The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an 
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is 
allowed:  
Code executed in the Boot Mode 
·  has read and execute access to all code/data in the Test-
ROM, 
·  has read, write and execute access to all code/data in the 
MIFARE-EEPROM 
·  has read and write access to all data in the MIFARE-RAM 
Code executed in the Test Mode 
·  has read and execute access to all code/data in the whole 
ROM, 
·  has read, write and execute access to all code/data in the 
whole EEPROM 
·  has read and write access to all data in the whole RAM 
Code executed in the MIFARE Mode 
·  has read and execute access to all code/data in the Test-
ROM, 
·  has read, write and execute access to all code/data in the 
MIFARE-EEPROM 
·  has read and write access to all data in the MIFARE-RAM 
Code executed in the System Mode 
 
19   [assignment: access control SFP] 
20   [assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-
relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes]  
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·  has read and execute access to all code/data in the 
Application-ROM, 
·  has read, write and execute access to all code/data in the 
Application-EEPROM, 
·  has read and write access to all data in the Application-
RAM, 
Code executed in the User Mode 
·  has read and/or execute access to code/data in the 
Application-ROM controlled by the MMU Segment Table 
used by the Memory Management Unit, 
·  has read and/or write and/or execute access to code/data 
in the Application-EEPROM controlled by the MMU 
Segment Table used by the Memory Management Unit, 
·  has read and/or write access to data in the Application-
RAM controlled by the MMU Segment Table used by the 
Memory Management Unit. 
21 
FDP_ACF.1.3  The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects 
based on the following additional rules: Code running in 
MIFARE Mode has read access to 64 bytes in the Application-
ROM storing the “Access Condition Matrix”. Code running in 
MIFARE Mode has access to the Application-RAM defined by 
the Special Function Register MXBASL, MXBASH, MXSZL 
and MXSZH. Code running in Boot Mode or MIFARE Mode 
has read access to the Security Rows stored in the 
Application-EEPROM. The FameXE coprocessor has read 
access to the EEPROM and read/write access to the FameXE 
RAM. 
22 
FDP_ACF.1.4  The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects 
based on the rules: no explicit rules 
23. 
Dependencies:  FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control 
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation 
FDP_ACF.1[SFR]  Security attribute based access control 
Hierarchical to:  No other components. 
FDP_ACF.1.1  The TSF shall enforce the Access Control Policy 
24 to objects 
based on the following: all subjects and objects and the 
attributes CPU mode, the MMU Segment Table and the 
Special Function Registers FWCTRLL and FWCTRLH 
25. 
FDP_ACF.1.2  The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an 
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is 
allowed: 
 
21   [assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using 
controlled operations on controlled objects] 
22   [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects] 
23   [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects] 
24   [assignment: access control SFP] 
25   [assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-
relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes]  
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·  The code executed in Boot Mode is allowed to access all 
Special Function Register groups. 
·  The code executed in Test Mode is allowed to access all 
Special Function Register groups. 
·  The code executed in MIFARE Mode is allowed to read 
Special Function Registers to configure the MIFARE 
firewall and to read/write Special Function Registers used 
by the MIFARE Operating System. Access to Special 
Function Registers related to hardware components is 
based on the access rights determined by the Special 
Function Registers FWCTRLL and FWCTRLH. 
·  The code executed in System Mode is allowed to access 
Special Function Registers to configure the MMU 
segmentation, Special Function Registers related to system 
management, Special Function Registers to configure the 
MIFARE firewall and Special Function Registers related to 
hardware components. 
·  The code executed in the User Mode is allowed to access 
Special Function Registers related to hardware 
components based on the access rights defined in the 
respective Memory Segment in the MMU Segment Table 
from which the code is actually executed 
26. 
FDP_ACF.1.3  The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects 
based on the following additional rules: In any CPU mode 
access to the Special Function Registers related to general 
CPU functionality is allowed. The Special Function Register 
PSWH belonging to group Special Function Registers related 
to system management is additionally readable in MIFARE 
Mode and User Mode. The Special Function Register 
CLKSEL of the group Special Function Registers related to 
hardware components can be read in the MIFARE Mode 
regardless of the MIFARE firewall settings given by FWCTRLL 
and FWCTRLH. 
27 
FDP_ACF.1.4  The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects 
based on the rules: Access to Special Function Registers to 
configure the MMU segmentation is denied in all CPU modes 
except System Mode. The Special Function Registers RPT0, 
RPT1 and RPT2 of the group Special Function Registers 
related to system management are not readable. The Special 
Function Register RNR of the group Special Function 
Registers related to hardware components is read-only. The 
Special Function Registers AKEY and DKEY of the group 
Special Function Registers related to hardware components 
are not readable. 
28 
 
26   [assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using 
controlled operations on controlled objects] 
27   [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects] 
28   [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]  
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Dependencies:  FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control 
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation 
Implications of the Access Control Policy 
The Access Control Policy has some implications, that can be drawn from the policy and 
that are essential parts of the TOE security functionality. 
·  Code executed in the Boot Mode or the Test Mode is quite powerful and used to 
configure and test the TOE. 
·  Code executed in the MIFARE Mode is separated from code executed in System 
Mode or User Mode. The separation is enforced by the partition of the memories 
provided by the Memory Management Unit. Only small memory areas are used for 
data exchange between the MIFARE Operating System and the Security IC 
Embedded Software. Furthermore, the exchange area in RAM is fully controlled by 
code running in System Mode. 
·  Code executed in the System Mode can administrate the configuration of Memory 
Management Unit, because it has access to the respective Special Function 
Registers. Configuration means that the code can change the address of the MMU 
Segment Table and also modify the contents of it (as long as the table is located in 
write-able memory). 
·  Code executed in the User Mode cannot administrate the configuration of the 
Memory Management Unit, because it has no access to the Special Function 
Registers to configure the MMU segmentation. Therefore changing the pointer to the 
MMU Segment Table is not possible. 
·  It may be possible for User Mode code to modify the MMU Segment Table contents if 
the table itself is residing in a memory location that is part of a Memory Segment that 
the code has write access to. 
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3)” as 
specified below. 
FMT_MSA.3[MEM]  Static attribute initialisation 
Hierarchical to:  No other components. 
FMT_MSA.3.1  The TSF shall enforce the Access Control Policy 
29 to provide 
restrictive 
30 default values for security attributes that are used 
to enforce the SFP. 
FMT_MSA.3.2  The TSF shall allow no subject 
31 to specify alternative initial 
values to override the default values when an object or 
information is created. 
Dependencies:  FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes 
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles 
Application Note:  Restrictive means here that the reset values of the Special 
Function Register regarding the address of the MMU Segment 
Table are set to zero, which effectively disables any memory 
segment so that no User Mode code can be executed by the 
CPU. Furthermore, the memory partition can not be 
configured at all. 
 
29   [assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP] 
30  [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]] 
31   [assignment: the authorised identified roles]  
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  The TOE does not provide objects or information that can be 
created, since it provides access to memory areas. The 
definition of objects that are stored in the TOE’s memory is 
subject to the Security IC Embedded Software. 
FMT_MSA.3[SFR]  Static attribute initialisation 
Hierarchical to:  No other components. 
FMT_MSA.3.1  The TSF shall enforce the Access Control Policy 
32 to provide 
restrictive 
33 default values for security attributes that are used 
to enforce the SFP. 
FMT_MSA.3.2  The TSF shall allow no subject 
34 to specify alternative initial 
values to override the default values when an object or 
information is created. 
Dependencies:  FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes 
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles 
Application Note:  The TOE does not provide objects or information that can be 
created since no further security attributes can be derived (i.e. 
the set of Special Function Registers that contain security 
attributes is fixed). The definition of objects that are stored in 
the TOE’s memory is subject to the Security IC Embedded 
Software. 
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1)” 
as specified below. 
FMT_MSA.1[MEM]  Management of security attributes 
Hierarchical to:  No other components. 
FMT_MSA.1.1  The TSF shall enforce the Access Control Policy 
35 to restrict 
the ability to modify 
36 the security attributes Special Function 
Registers to configure the MMU segmentation 
37 to code 
executed in the System Mode 
38. 
Dependencies:  [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control or  
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] 
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles 
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions 
Application Note:  The MMU Segment Table is not included in this requirement 
because it is located in the memory of the TOE and access to 
it is possible for every role that has access to the respective 
memory locations. 
  This component does not include any management 
functionality for the configuration of the memory partition. This 
 
32   [assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP] 
33  [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]] 
34   [assignment: the authorised identified roles] 
35   [assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)] 
36   [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]] 
37   [assignment: list of security attributes] 
38   [assignment: the authorised identified roles]  
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is because the memory partition is fixed and cannot be 
changed after TOE delivery. 
FMT_MSA.1[SFR]  Management of security attributes 
Hierarchical to:  No other components. 
FMT_MSA.1.1  The TSF shall enforce the Access Control Policy 
39 to restrict 
the ability to modify 
40 the security attributes defined in Special 
Function Registers 
41 to code executed in a CPU mode which 
has write access to the respective Special Function 
Registers 
42. 
Dependencies:  [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control or  
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] 
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles 
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions 
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Specification of Management Functions 
(FMT_SMF.1)” as specified below. 
FMT_SMF.1  Specification of Management Functions 
Hierarchical to:  No other components. 
FMT_SMF.1.1  The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security 
management functions: 
  Change of the CPU mode by calling a system call vector 
(SVEC) or configuration vector (CVEC) address, 
  change of the CPU mode by invoking an exception or 
interrupt, 
  change of the CPU mode by finishing an exception/interrupt 
(with a RETI instruction), 
  change of the CPU mode with a special 
LCALL/ACALL/ECALL address, 
  change of the CPU mode by writing to the respective bits in 
the PSWH Special Function Register and 
  modification of the Special Function Registers containing 
security attributes, and 
  modification of the MMU Segment Table. 
43 
Dependencies:  No dependencies 
Application Note:  The iteration of FMT_MSA.1 with the dependency to 
FMT_SMF.1 may imply a separation of the Specification of 
Management Functions. Iteration of FMT_SMF.1 is not 
needed because all management functions rely on the same 
features implemented in the hardware. 
 
39   [assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)] 
40   [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]] 
41   [assignment: list of security attributes] 
42   [assignment: the authorised identified roles] 
43   [assignment: list of management functions to be provided by the TSF]  
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6.2  Security Assurance Requirements 
Table 15 below lists all security assurance components that are valid for this Security 
Target. With one exception these security assurance components are required by EAL5 
(see section 2.2) or by the PP “Security IC Platform Protection Profile” [6].  
The exception is the component ASE_TSS.2 which is chosen as an augmentation in this 
Security Target to give architectural information on the security functionality of the TOE. 
Considering Application Note 21 of [6] the column “Required by” shows the differences in 
the requirements of security assurance components between the PP [6] and the Security 
Target. The entry “EAL5 / PP” denotes, that an SAR is required by both EAL5 and the 
requirement of the PP [6], “EAL5” means that this requirement is due to EAL5 and 
beyond the requirement of the PP [6], and “PP” identifies this component as a 
requirement of the PP which is beyond EAL5. The augmentation ASE_TSS.2 chosen in 
this Security Target is denoted by "ST". The refinements of the PP [6], that must be 
adapted for EAL5, are described in section 6.2.1.  
Table 15.  Security Assurance Requirements 
SAR  Title  Required by 
ADV_ARC.1  Security architecture description  EAL5 / PP 
ADV_FSP.5  Complete semi-formal functional specification with 
additional error information  
EAL5 
ADV_IMP.1  Implementation representation of the TSF  EAL5 / PP 
ADV_INT.2  Well-structured internals  EAL5 
ADV_TDS.4  Semiformal modular design  EAL5 
AGD_OPE.1  Operational user guidance  EAL5 / PP 
AGD_PRE.1  Preparative procedures  EAL5 / PP 
ALC_CMC.4  Production support, acceptance procedures and 
automation 
EAL5 / PP 
ALC_CMS.5  Development tools CM coverage   EAL5 
ALC_DEL.1  Delivery procedures   EAL5 / PP 
ALC_DVS.2  Sufficiency of security measures   PP 
ALC_LCD.1  Developer defined life-cycle model   EAL5 / PP 
ALC_TAT.2  Compliance with implementation standards   EAL5 
ASE_CCL.1  Conformance claims  EAL5 / PP 
ASE_ECD.1  Extended components definition  EAL5 / PP 
ASE_INT.1  ST introduction  EAL5 / PP 
ASE_OBJ.2  Security objectives  EAL5 / PP 
ASE_REQ.2  Derived security requirements  EAL5 / PP 
ASE_SPD.1  Security problem definition  EAL5 / PP  
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SAR  Title  Required by 
ASE_TSS.2  TOE summary specification with architectural design 
summary 
ST 
ATE_COV.2  Analysis of coverage   EAL5 / PP 
ATE_DPT.3  Testing: modular design   EAL5 
ATE_FUN.1  Functional testing   EAL5 / PP 
ATE_IND.2  Independent testing - sample   EAL5 / PP 
AVA_VAN.5  Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis  PP 
 
6.2.1  Refinements of the Security Assurance Requirements 
The Security Target claims conformance to the PP [6] and therefore it has to be conform 
to the refinements of the TOE security assurance requirements (see Application Note 22 
in [6]). Because the refinements in the PP [6] are defined for the security assurance 
components of EAL4, some refinements have to be applied to assurance components of 
the higher level EAL5 stated in the Security Target. 
Table 16 lists the influences of the refinements of the PP [6] on the Security Target. Most 
of the refined security assurance components have the same level in both documents 
(PP [6] and Security Target). The following two subsections apply the refinements to 
ALC_CMS.5 and ADV_FSP.5 which are different between the PP [6] and the Security 
Target. 
Table 16.  Security Assurance Requirements, overview of differences of refinements 
Refined in PP [6]  Influence on Security Target 
ALC_DEL  Same as in PP, refinement valid without change 
ALC_DVS  Same as in PP, refinement valid without change 
ALC_CMS  ALC_CMS.5, refinements valid without change 
ALC_CMC  Same as in PP, refinement valid without change 
ADV_ARC  Same as in PP, refinement valid without change 
ADV_FSP  ADV_FSP.5, refinements have to be adapted 
ADV_IMP  Same as in PP, refinement valid without change 
ATE_COV  Same as in PP, refinement valid without change 
AGD_OPE  Same as in PP, refinement valid without change 
AGD_PRE  Same as in PP, refinement valid without change 
AVA_VAN  Same as in PP, refinement valid without change 
44 
 
44  According to the Application Note 30 in [6] the Security Target should indicate the version of the 
document Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document Application of Attack Potential to 
Smartcards [7] used for the vulnerability analysis. The current version is given in the bibliography.  
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6.2.1.1  Refinements regarding CM scope (ALC_CMS) 
This Security Target requires a higher evaluation level for the CC family ALC_CMS, 
namely ALC_CMS.5 instead of ALC_CMS.4. The refinement of the PP [6] regarding 
ALC_CMS.4 is a clarification of the configuration item “TOE implementation 
representation”. Since in ALC_CMS.5, the content and presentation of evidence element 
ALC_CMS.5.1C only adds a further configuration item to the list of items to be tracked by 
the CM system, the refinement can be applied without changes. 
The refinement of the configuration item “TOE implementation representation” of 
ALC_CMS.4 can be found in section 6.2.1.3 of [6] and is not cited here. 
6.2.1.2  Refinements regarding functional specification (ADV_FSP) 
This Security Target requires a higher evaluation level for the CC family ADV_FSP, 
namely ADV_FSP.5 instead of ADV_FSP.4. The refinement of the PP [6] regarding 
ADV_FSP.4 is concerned with the complete representation of the TSF, the purpose and 
method of use of all TSFI, and the accuracy and completeness of the SFR instantiations. 
The refinement is not a change in the wording of the action elements, but a more detailed 
definition of the above items. 
The higher level ADV_FSP.5 requires a Functional Specification in a “semi-formal style" 
(ADV_FSP.5.2C). 
The component ADV_FSP.5 enlarges the scope of the error messages to be described 
from those resulting from an invocation of a TSFI (ADV_FSP.5.6C) to also those not 
resulting from an invocation of a TSFI (ADV_FSP.5.7C). For the latter a rationale shall be 
provided (ADV_FSP.5.8C).  
Since the higher level ADV_FSP.5 only affects the style of description and the scope of 
and rationale for error messages, the refinements can be applied without changes and 
are valid for ADV_FSP.5. 
The refinement of the original component ADV_FSP.4 can be found in section 6.2.1.6 of 
the Protection Profile [6] and is not cited here. 
6.3  Security Requirements Rationale 
6.3.1  Rationale for the security functional requirements 
Section 6.3.1 in [6] provides a rationale for the mapping between security functional 
requirements and security objectives defined in the PP [6]. The mapping is reproduced in 
the following table. 
Table 17.  Security Requirements versus Security Objectives 
Objective  TOE Security Functional Requirements 
O.Leak-Inherent  FDP_ITT.1 “Basic internal transfer protection” 
FPT_ITT.1 “Basic internal TSF data transfer protection” 
FDP_IFC.1 “Subset information flow control” 
O.Phys-Probing  FPT_PHP.3 “Resistance to physical attack” 
O.Malfunction  FRU_FLT.2 “Limited fault tolerance 
FPT_FLS.1 “Failure with preservation of secure state” 
O.Phys-Manipulation  FPT_PHP.3 “Resistance to physical attack”  
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Objective  TOE Security Functional Requirements 
O.Leak-Forced  All requirements listed for O.Leak-Inherent 
FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1 
plus those listed for O.Malfunction and  
O.Phys-Manipulation 
FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3 
O.Abuse-Func  FMT_LIM.1 “Limited capabilities” 
FMT_LIM.2 “Limited availability” 
plus those for O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction, 
O.Phys-Manipulation, O.Leak-Forced 
FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_PHP.3, FRU_FLT.2, 
FPT_FLS.1 
O.Identification  FAU_SAS.1 “Audit storage” 
O.RND  FCS_RNG.1 “Quality metric for random numbers” 
plus those for O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction, 
O.Phys-Manipulation, O.Leak-Forced 
FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_PHP.3, FRU_FLT.2, 
FPT_FLS.1 
OE.Plat-Appl  not applicable 
OE.Resp-Appl  not applicable 
OE.Process-Sec-IC  not applicable 
 
The Security Target additionally defines the SFRs for the TOE that are listed in Table 18. 
In addition Security Requirements for the Environment are defined. The following table 
gives an overview, how the requirements are combined to meet the security objectives. 
Table 18.  Mapping of security objectives and requirements 
Objective  TOE Security Functional Requirement 
O.HW_DES3  FCS_COP.1[DES] 
O.HW_AES  FCS_COP.1[AES] 
O.MF_FW  FDP_ACC.1[MEM] 
FDP_ACF.1[MEM] 
FMT_MSA.3[MEM] 
O.MEM_ACCESS  FDP_ACC.1[MEM] 
FDP_ACF.1[MEM] 
FMT_MSA.3[MEM] 
FMT_MSA.1[MEM] 
FMT_MSA.1[SFR] 
FMT_SMF.1 
O.SFR_ACCESS  FDP_ACC.1[SFR] 
FDP_ACF.1[SFR] 
FMT_MSA.3[SFR] 
FMT_MSA.1[SFR]  
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Objective  TOE Security Functional Requirement 
FMT_SMF.1 
OE.Check-Init  not applicable 
 
The justification related to the security objective “Triple DES Functionality” 
(O.HW_DES3) is as follows: 
O.HW_DES3 requires the TOE to support Triple DES encryption and decryption. Exactly 
this is the requirement of FCS_COP.1[DES]. Therefore FCS_COP.1[DES] is suitable to 
meet O.HW_DES3. 
The justification related to the security objective “AES Functionality” (O.HW_AES) is as 
follows: 
O.HW_AES requires the TOE to support AES encryption and decryption. Exactly this is 
the requirement of FCS_COP.1[AES]. Therefore FCS_COP.1[AES] is suitable to meet 
O.HW_AES. 
The justification related to the security objective “MIFARE Firewall” (O.MF_FW) is as 
follows: 
The security functional requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1[MEM])” with the 
related Security Function Policy (SFP) “Access Control Policy” exactly require to 
implement a memory partition as demanded by O.MF_FW. Therefore, 
FDP_ACC.1[MEM] with its SFP is suitable to meet the security objective. 
The security functional requirement “Security attribute based access control 
(FDP_ACF.1[MEM])” with the related Security Function Policy (SFP) “Access Control 
Policy” defines the rules to implement the partition as demanded by O.MF_FW. 
Therefore, FDP_ACF.1[MEM] with its SFP is suitable to meet the security objective. 
The security functional requirement “Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3[MEM])” 
requires that the TOE provide default values for the security attributes used by the 
Memory Management Unit to enforce the memory partition. These default values are 
generated by the reset procedure and the Boot-ROM Software for the related Special 
Function Register. Restrictive with respect to memory partition means that the partition 
cannot be changed at all and for the memory segmentation means that the initial setting 
is very restrictive since it effectively disables any memory segment. They are needed by 
the TOE to provide a default configuration after reset. Therefore this requirement (as 
dependency from FDP_ACF.1) is suitable to meet the security objective. 
The security functional requirement “Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1)” 
requires that the ability to update the security attributes is restricted to privileged 
subject(s). No management ability is specified in the two iterations of FMT_MSA.1 that 
can be used to change the memory partition. Also no related management function is 
specified by FMT_SMF.1. Therefore the memory partition is fixed and cannot be 
changed any subject, which is the requirement of O.MF_FW. 
The justification related to the security objective “Area based Memory Access Control 
(O.MEM_ACCESS)” is as follows: 
The security functional requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1[MEM])” with the 
related Security Function Policy (SFP) “Access Control Policy” exactly require to 
implement an area based memory access control as demanded by O.MEM_ACCESS. 
Therefore, FDP_ACC.1[MEM] with its SFP is suitable to meet the security objective.  
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The security functional requirement “Security attribute based access control 
(FDP_ACF.1[MEM])” with the related Security Function Policy (SFP) “Access Control 
Policy” defines the rules to implement the area based memory access control as 
demanded by O.MEM_ACCESS. Therefore, FDP_ACF.1[MEM] with its SFP is suitable 
to meet the security objective. 
The security functional requirement “Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3[MEM])” 
requires that the TOE provide default values for the security attributes used by the 
Memory Management Units. Since the TOE is a hardware platform these default values 
are generated by the reset procedure for the related Special Function Register. They are 
needed by the TOE to provide a default configuration after reset. Therefore this 
requirement (as dependency from FDP_ACF.1) is suitable to meet the security objective. 
The security functional requirement “Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1)” 
requires that the ability to update the security attributes is restricted to privileged 
subject(s). These management functions ensure that the required access control can be 
realised using the functions provided by the TOE. The iteration of FMT_MSA.1 into 
FMT_MSA.1[MEM] and FMT_MSA.1[SFR] is needed because the different types of 
objects have different security attributes. The security attributes of the Memory 
Management Unit can be changed by the Security IC Embedded Software. Since the 
pointer to the MMU Segment Table can only be changed in System Mode and this 
protection is implemented by access control to the respective Special Function Registers, 
both iterations are needed for O.MEM_ACCESS. 
Finally, the security functional requirement “Specification of Management Functions 
(FMT_SMF.1)” is used for the specification of the management functions to be provided 
by the TOE as demanded by O.MEM_ACCESS. Therefore, FMT_SMF.1 is suitable to 
meet the security objective. 
The justification related to the security objective “Special Function Register Access 
Control (O.SFR_ACCESS)” is as follows: 
The security functional requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1[SFR])” with the 
related Security Function Policy (SFP) “Access Control Policy” require to implement 
access control for Special Function Register as demanded by O.SFR_ACCESS. 
Therefore, FDP_ACC.1[SFR] with its SFP is suitable to meet the security objective. 
The access to Special Function Register is related to the CPU mode. The Special 
Function Register used to configure the Memory Management Unit can only be accessed 
in the System Mode. The Special Function Register required to use hardware 
components like e.g. the coprocessors or the Random Number Generator can be 
accessed in the System Mode as specified by the Security Function Policy (SFP) 
“Access Control Policy”. In the User Mode only Special Function Register required to run 
the CPU are accessible by default. In addition, specific Special Function Registers 
related to hardware components can be made accessible for the User Mode if the 
Memory Management Unit is configured to allow this. 
The security functional requirement “Security attribute based access control 
(FDP_ACF.1[SFR])” with the related Security Function Policy “Access Control Policy” 
exactly require certain security attributes to implement the access control to Special 
Function Register as demanded by O.SFR_ACCESS. Therefore, FDP_ACF.1[SFR] with 
its SFP is suitable to meet the security objective. 
The security functional requirement “Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3[SFR])” 
requires that the TOE provides default values for the Special Function Register (values 
as well as access control). The default values are needed to ensure a defined setup for  
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the operation of the TOE. Therefore this requirement (as dependency from FDP_ACF.1) 
is suitable to meet the security objective. 
The security functional requirement “Management of security attributes 
(FMT_MSA.1[SFR])” is realised in a way that – besides the definition of access rights to 
Special Function Registers related to hardware components in User Mode and MIFARE 
Mode - no management of the security attributes is possible because the attributes are 
implemented in the hardware and cannot be changed. 
Finally, the security functional requirement “Specification of Management Functions 
(FMT_SMF.1)” is used for the specification of the management functions to be provided 
by the TOE as demanded by O.SFR_ACCESS. Therefore, FMT_SMF.1 is suitable to 
meet the security objective. 
Note that the iteration of FDP_ACF.1 and FDP_ACC.1 with the respective dependencies 
are needed to separate the different types of objects because they have different security 
attributes. 
6.3.2  Dependencies of security functional requirements 
The dependencies listed in the PP [6] are independent of the additional dependencies 
listed in the table below. The dependencies of the PP [6] are fulfilled within the PP [6] 
and at least one dependency is considered to be satisfied. 
The following discussion demonstrates how the dependencies defined by Part 2 of the 
Common Criteria for the requirements specified in sections 6.1.2 and 6.1.3 are satisfied. 
The dependencies defined in the Common Criteria are listed in the table below: 
Table 19.  Dependencies of security functional requirements 
Security Functional 
Requirement 
Dependencies  Fulfilled by security 
requirements in this ST 
FCS_COP.1[DES]  FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2, or 
FCS_CKM.1 
FCS_CKM.4 
See discussion below 
FCS_COP.1[AES]  FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2, or 
FCS_CKM.1 
FCS_CKM.4 
See discussion below 
FDP_ACC.1[MEM]  FDP_ACF.1  Yes, by FDP_ACF.1[MEM] 
FDP_ACC.1[SFR]  FDP_ACF.1  Yes, by FDP_ACF.1[SFR] 
FDP_ACF.1[MEM]  FDP_ACC.1 
FMT_MSA.3  
Yes, by FDP_ACC.1[MEM] 
Yes 
FDP_ACF.1[SFR]  FDP_ACC.1 
FMT_MSA.3  
Yes, by FDP_ACC.1[SFR] 
Yes 
FMT_MSA.3[MEM]  FMT_MSA.1 
FMT_SMR.1 
Yes, by FMT_MSA.1[MEM] 
See discussion below 
FMT_MSA.3[SFR]  FMT_MSA.1 
FMT_SMR.1 
Yes, by FMT_MSA.1[SFR]  
See discussion below 
FMT_MSA.1[MEM]  FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1  Yes, by FDP_ACC.1[MEM]  
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Security Functional 
Requirement 
Dependencies  Fulfilled by security 
requirements in this ST 
FMT_SMR.1 
FMT_SMF.1 
See discussion below 
Yes 
FMT_MSA.1[SFR]  FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1 
FMT_SMR.1 
FMT_SMF.1 
Yes, by FDP_ACC.1[SFR] 
See discussion below 
Yes 
 
The developer of the Security IC Embedded Software must ensure that the additional 
security functional requirements FCS_COP.1[DES] and FCS_COP.1[AES] are used as 
specified and that the User Data processed by the related security functionality is 
protected as defined for the application context. 
The dependent requirements of FCS_COP.1[DES] and FCS_COP.1[AES] completely 
address the appropriate management of cryptographic keys used by the specified 
cryptographic function and the management of access control rights as specified for the 
memory access control function. All requirements concerning these management 
functions shall be fulfilled by the environment (Security IC Embedded Software). 
The functional requirements [FDP_ITC.1, or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1] and 
FCS_CKM.4 are not included in this Security Target since the TOE only provides a pure 
engine for encryption and decryption without additional features for the handling of 
cryptographic keys. Therefore the Security IC Embedded Software must fulfil these 
requirements related to the needs of the realised application. 
The dependency FMT_SMR.1 introduced by the two components FMT_MSA.1 and 
FMT_MSA.3 must be fulfilled by the Security IC Embedded Software. The definition and 
maintenance of the roles that act on behalf of the functions provided by the hardware 
must be subject of the Security IC Embedded Software. 
6.3.3  Rationale for the Assurance Requirements 
The selection of assurance components is based on the underlying PP [6]. The Security 
Target uses the same augmentations as the PP, but chooses a higher assurance level. 
The level EAL5 is chosen in order to meet assurance expectations of digital signature 
applications and electronic payment systems. Additionally, the requirement of the PP [6] 
to choose at least EAL4 is fulfilled. 
The rationale for the augmentations is the same as in the PP. The assurance level EAL5 
is an elaborated pre-defined level of the CC, part 3 [3]. The assurance components in an 
EAL level are chosen in a way that they build a mutually supportive and complete set of 
components. The requirements chosen for augmentation do not add any dependencies, 
which are not already fulfilled for the corresponding requirements contained in EAL 5. 
Therefore, these components add additional assurance to EAL 5, but the mutual support 
of the requirements is still guaranteed. 
As stated in the section 6.3.3 of [6], it has to be assumed that attackers with high attack 
potential try to attack smart cards used for digital signature applications or payment 
systems. Therefore specifically AVA_VAN.5 was chosen by the PP [6] in order to assure 
that even these attackers cannot successfully attack the TOE.   
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6.3.4  Security Requirements are Internally Consistent 
The discussion of security functional requirements and assurance components in the 
preceding sections has shown that mutual support and consistency are given for both 
groups of requirements. The arguments given for the fact that the assurance components 
are adequate for the functionality of the TOE also show that the security functional and 
assurance requirements support each other and that there are no inconsistencies 
between these groups. 
The security functional requirements required to meet the security objectives O.Leak-
Inherent, O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction, O.Phys-Manipulation and O.Leak-Forced also 
protect the cryptographic algorithms and the memory access/separation control function 
as well as the access control to Special Function Register implemented according to the 
security functional requirement FCS_COP.1[DES], FCS_COP.1[AES] and 
FDP_ACC.1[MEM], FDP_ACC.1[SFR] with reference to the Access Control Policies 
defined in FDP_ACF.1[MEM] and FDP_ACF.1[SFR]. Therefore, these security functional 
requirements support the secure implementation and operation of FCS_COP.1[DES], 
FCS_COP.1[AES] and of FDP_ACC.1 with FDP_ACF.1 as well as the dependent 
security functional requirements. 
A Security IC hardware platform requires Security IC Embedded Software to build a 
secure product. Thereby the Security IC Embedded Software must support the security 
functionality of the hardware and implement a sufficient management of the security 
services implemented in the hardware. The realisation of the Security Functional 
Requirements within the TOE provides a good balance between flexible configuration 
and restrictions to ensure a secure behaviour of the TOE.  
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7.  TOE Summary Specification 
This chapter is composed of sections “Portions of the TOE Security Functionality” and 
“TOE Summary Specification Rationale”. 
7.1  Portions of the TOE Security Functionality 
The TOE Security Functionality (TSF) directly corresponds to the TOE security functional 
requirements defined in chapter 6. It is split into Security Services (SS) and Security 
Features (SF), which are applicable to phases 4 to 7 of the Security IC product life-cycle.  
Note:  Parts of the security functionality are configured at the end of phase 3 and 
all security functionality is active after phase 3.  
The TOE also comprises security mechanisms, which are not listed as security 
functionality in the following. Such mechanisms do not provide a complete portion of TOE 
security functionality, but they can be used to support a portion of security functionality 
implemented by the Security IC Embedded Software, e.g. the FameXE coprocessor for 
asymmetric cryptographic algorithms or the CRC calculation for the control of data 
integrity. 
7.1.1  Security Services  
SS.RNG: Random Number Generator 
The Random Number Generator continuously produces random numbers with a length of 
one byte. The TOE implements SS.RNG by means of a physical hardware Random 
Number Generator working stable within the valid ranges of operating conditions, which 
are guaranteed by SF.OPC.  
The TSF provides a hardware test functionality, which can be used by the Security IC 
Embedded Software to detect faults in the hardware of the Random Number Generator. 
According to “AIS31” [5] the Random Number Generator claims the fulfilment of the 
requirements of functionality class P2. This means that the Random Number Generator 
is suitable for generation of signature key pairs, generation of session keys for symmetric 
encryption mechanisms, random padding bits, zero-knowledge proofs and the generation 
of seeds for DRNGs. 
SS.HW_DES: Triple-DES coprocessor 
The TOE provides the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) according to the Data 
Encryption Standard (DES). SS.HW_DES is a modular basic cryptographic function,  
which provides the TDEA algorithm as defined by FIPS PUB 46 by means of a hardware 
coprocessor and supports (a) the 3-key Triple-DEA algorithm according to keying option 
1 and (b) the 2-key Triple DEA algorithm according to keying option 2 in FIPS PUB 46-3 
[17]. The two/three 56-bit keys (112-/168-bit) for the 2-key/3-key Triple DES algorithm 
shall be provided by the Security IC Embedded Software. For encryption the Security IC 
Embedded Software provides 8 bytes of the plain text and SS.HW_DES calculates 
8 bytes cipher text. The calculation output is read by the Security IC Embedded 
Software. For decryption the Security IC Embedded Software provides 8 bytes of cipher 
text and SS.HW_DES calculates 8 bytes plain text. The calculation output is read by the 
Security IC Embedded Software. 
SS.HW_AES: AES coprocessor 
The TOE provides the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm according to the 
Advanced Encryption Standard as defined by FIPS PUB 197 [18]. SS.HW_AES is a 
modular basic cryptographic function, which provides the AES algorithm by means of a  
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hardware coprocessor and supports the AES algorithm with three different key lengths of 
128, 192 or 256 bit. The keys for the AES algorithm shall be provided by the Security IC 
Embedded Software. For encryption the Security IC Embedded Software provides 
16 bytes of the plain text and SS.HW_AES calculates 16 bytes cipher text. The 
calculation output is read by the Security IC Embedded Software. For decryption the 
Security IC Embedded Software provides 16 bytes of cipher text and SS.HW_AES 
calculates 16 bytes plain text. The calculation output is read by the Security IC 
Embedded Software. 
7.1.2  Security Features  
SF.OPC: Control of Operating Conditions  
SF.OPC ensures correct operation of the TOE (functions offered by the microcontroller 
including the standard CPU as well as the Triple-DES coprocessor, AES coprocessor, 
the arithmetic coprocessor, the memories, registers, I/O interfaces and the other system 
peripherals) during execution of the IC Dedicated Support Software and Security IC 
Embedded Software. This includes all specific security mechanisms of the TOE, which 
are able to provide an active response. 
The TOE ensures its correct operation and prevents from any malfunction using the 
following mechanisms: filtering of power supply and clock frequency input as well as 
monitoring of voltage supply, clock frequency input and the temperature of the chip by 
means of sensors. There are multiple sensors for the different ISO/IEC 7816 voltage 
classes and the contactless operation mode. Light sensors are distributed over the chip 
surface and used to detect light attacks. Thresholds of the parameters, which are 
monitored by the mechanisms, are set appropriate to the range where the TOE ensures 
its correct operation. In addition to the light sensors the EEPROM provides two functions 
to detect light attacks. The Security IC Embedded Software can select one function and 
also disable both functions of the EEPROM detection function.  
Specific functional units of the TOE are equipped with the Secure Fetch or other special 
circuitry to detect fault injection attacks. These are the Program Counter, the stack 
pointer, the PSWH register, the MMU address cache registers, the DES coprocessor, 
AES coprocessor, and the FameXE coprocessor. 
If one of the monitored parameters is out of the specified range, either (i) a reset is forced 
and the actually running program is aborted or (ii) an exception is raised which interrupts 
the program flow and allows a reaction of the Security IC Embedded Software. A reset is 
forced by the sensors for voltage, frequency, temperature and light, the Secure Fetch 
and the single fault injection detection in the MMU address cache registers. An exception 
is forced by the EEPROM light detector and the other single fault injection detection 
circuitry. In case the inverse error correction of the EEPROM is enabled (refer to section 
1.4.1.2) the probability to detect fault injection errors increases and the error correction 
logic raises an exception when detecting an error. In case the TOE resets all 
components of the TOE are initialised with their reset values and the TOE provides a 
reset cause indicator to the Security IC Embedded Software. In the case an exception is 
raised an indicator for the reason of the exception is provided. 
Test Mode is disabled before TOE delivery. In all other modes except Test Mode the 
TOE automatically enables the sensors when operated. Furthermore the TOE defends 
the sensors from being disabled by the Security IC Embedded Software. The assignment 
which sensor raises an exception or forces a reset is hard-wired and can not be changed 
by the Security IC Embedded Software.   
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The TOE also controls the specified range of the stack pointer. The stack pointer and the 
control logic are implemented threefold for the User Mode, System Mode and Super 
System Mode (comprising Boot Mode, Test Mode and MIFARE Mode). An exception is 
generated in case the specified limits are exceeded.  
In addition, SF.OPC comprises a sensor, which checks the high voltage of the write 
process to the EEPROM during each write sequence. The result of this sensor must be 
read from a Special Function Register and does not force an automatic event (e.g. 
exception).  
SF.PHY: Protection against Physical Manipulation 
SF.PHY protects the TOE against manipulation of (i) the IC hardware, (ii) the IC 
Dedicated Software in ROM, (iii) the Security IC Embedded Software in ROM and 
EEPROM, (iv) the Application Data in EEPROM and RAM including TSF data in the 
Security Rows. It also protects User Data and TSF data against disclosure by physical 
probing when stored or while being processed by the TOE. 
The protection of the TOE comprises several security mechanisms in design and 
construction, which make reverse-engineering and tamper attacks more difficult. These 
mechanisms comprise dedicated shielding techniques for different components and 
specific encryption mechanisms for the memories. SF.PHY supports the efficiency of 
other portions of the security functionality. 
SF.PHY also supports the integrity of the EEPROM and the ROM. The EEPROM is able 
to correct a 1-bit error within each byte. The ROM provides a parity check. The EEPROM 
corrects errors automatically without user interaction, a ROM parity error forces a reset. 
SF.LOG: Logical Protection 
SF.LOG implements security mechanisms to limit or eliminate the information in the 
shape and amplitude of signals or in the time between events, which might be found by 
measuring such signals. This comprises the power supply and signals on other pads, 
which are not intentionally used for communication by the terminal or the Security IC 
Embedded Software. Therby SF.LOG prevents from disclosure of User Data and TSF 
data stored and/or processed in the Security IC through measurement of power 
consumption and subsequent complex signal analysis. This protection of the TOE is 
enforced by several security mechanisms in the design, which support other portions of 
security functionality. 
The Triple-DES coprocessor includes security mechanisms to prevent SPA/DPA analysis 
of shape and amplitude of the power consumption and ensures that the calculation time 
is independent from any key and plain/cipher text. 
The AES coprocessor includes security mechanisms to prevent SPA/DPA analysis of 
shape and amplitude of the power consumption and ensures that the calculation time is 
with respect to the key length independent from any plain/cipher text. 
The FameXE coprocessor provides measures to prevent timing attacks on basic modular 
function. The calculation time of an operation depends on the lengths of the operands, 
but not on the value of the operands, with the following exceptions: multiplication with 
reduction, modular inversion and modular division. These three operations have no 
constant timing due to correction cycles that are needed based on the calculation 
method. In addition, mechanisms are included, which provide limitations of the capability 
for the analysis of shape and amplitude of the power consumption. Of course the 
FameXE does not realise an algorithm on its own and algorithm-specific leakage  
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countermeasures have to be added by the Security IC Embedded Software when using 
the FameXE. 
Additional security mechanisms being configured by the Security IC Embedded Software 
comprise (i) FameXE HIGHSEC mode, which adds dummy calculations, and (ii) CPU 
clock configurations, that can be used to prevent the possibility to synchronise the 
internal operation with the external clock or to synchronise with the characteristics of the 
power consumption that can be used as trigger signal to support leakage attacks (DPA or 
timing attacks) 
Some mechanisms described for SF.PHY (e.g. the encryption mechanisms) and for 
SF.OPC (e.g. the filter mechanisms) also support SF.LOG.  
SF.COMP: Protection of Mode Control 
SF.COMP provides control of the CPU mode for (i) Boot Mode, (ii) Test Mode and (iii) 
MIFARE Mode. This includes protection of electronic fuses stored in a protected memory 
area, the so-called Security Rows, and the possibility to store initialisation or pre-
personalisation data in the so-called FabKey Area. 
Control of the CPU mode for Boot Mode, Test Mode and MIFARE Mode prevents from 
abuse of test functions after TOE delivery. It also inhibits abuse of features, which are 
used during start-up or reset to configure the TOE. The initial – but not user visible – 
CPU mode during start-up or reset is the Boot Mode. Hardware circuitry determines 
whether Test Mode is available or not. If available, the TOE jumps to the IC Dedicated 
Test Software in Test Mode. Otherwise, the TOE switches to System Mode – the initial 
user visible CPU mode – and starts execution of the Security IC Embedded Software.  
The protection of electronic fuses ensures secure storage of configuration and calibration 
data, which are set up in Test Mode. SF.COMP protects CPU mode switches regarding 
Boot Mode, Test Mode and MIFARE Mode in the following way: Switching from Boot 
Mode to Test Mode or MIFARE Mode is allowed, switching from these modes back to 
Boot Mode is prevented. Switching to Test Mode is prevented as well after TOE delivery, 
because Test Mode then is permanently disabled. SF.COMP also ensures that Boot 
Mode is active only in the boot phase during start-up or reset of the TOE, and can not be 
invoked afterwards. Therefore, once the TOE has left the test phase and each time the 
TOE completed start-up or reset, the MIFARE Mode is the only one available out of 
Super System Mode. Super System Mode is indicated by PSWH.SSM being set and 
means, that one CPU mode out of Boot Mode, Test Mode and MIFARE Mode is active. 
SF.COMP controls the mode, which is used, when bit PSWH.SSM is set.  
The protection of electronic fuses especially ensures that configuration options with 
regard to the security functionality can not be changed, abused or influenced in any way. 
SF.COMP ensures that activation or deactivation of security mechanisms can not be 
influenced by the Security IC Embedded Software so that the TSF provides self-
protection against interference and tampering by untrusted Security IC Embedded 
Software. 
The TSF controls access to the Security Rows, the top-most 128 Bytes of the EEPROM 
memory, accessible at reserved addresses in the memory map. The available EEPROM 
memory space for the Security IC Embedded Software is reduced by this area. 
SF.COMP provides three memory areas in the Security Rows,that can be used by the 
Security IC Embedded Software. These are  
·  the User Read Only Area 
·  the User Write Protected Area and  
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·  the User Write Once Area. 
The User Read Only Area contains 32 bytes, which are read-only for the Security IC 
Embedded Software. The User Write Protected area contains 16 bytes, which can be 
write-protected by the Security IC Embedded Software on demand. The User Write Once 
Area contains 32 bytes of which each bit can separately be set to ‘1’ once only, and not 
reset to ‘0’.  
If the Card Disable Function is used (refer to section 1.4.1.2) SF.COMP inhibits any start-
up of the Security IC Embedded Software once the Security IC Embedded Software 
disables the card. 
SF.COMP also provides the FabKey Area in which initialisation and identification data 
can be stored. The FabKey area does not belong to the Security Rows and is not 
protected by hardware mechanisms. The FabKey Area as well as the Security Rows can 
be used by SF.COMP to store a unique identification for each die. 
For all areas the initial values are set during chip testing and pre-personalisation. They 
depend on the choice of the Security IC Embedded Software developer and are included 
in the Order Entry Form. The User Write Protected Area and the User Write Once Area 
are designed to store the identification of a (fully personalised) Security IC (e.g. 
smartcard) or a sequence of events over the life cycle, that can be coded by an 
increasing number of bits set to "one" or protecting bytes, respectively. 
SF.COMP limits the capabilities of the test functions and provides test personnel during 
phase 3 with the capability to store identification and/or pre-personalisation data and/or 
supplements of the Security IC Embedded Software in the EEPROM. SF.COMP provides 
self-protection against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects both in the Test 
Mode and in the other modes. It also enforces the separation of domains regarding the 
IC Dedicated Software and the Security IC Embedded Software. 
SF.MEM_ACC: Memory Access Control 
SF.MEM_ACC controls access of any subject (program code comprising processor 
instructions) to the memories of the TOE through the Memory Management Unit. 
Memory access is based on virtual addresses that are mapped to physical addresses. 
The CPU always uses virtual addresses. The Memory Management Unit performs the 
translation from virtual to physical addresses and the physical addresses are passed 
from the Memory Management Unit to the memory interfaces to access the memories. 
The access control is performed in two ways: 
·  Memory partitioning: Each memory type ROM, RAM and EEPROM is partitioned into 
two parts. In Boot Mode, MIFARE Mode, System Mode and User Mode the CPU has 
access to only one part of each memory type. Access to both parts of each type is 
allowed in Test Mode for testing.   
·  Memory segmentation in User Mode: The three accessible parts of the memory in 
ROM, RAM and EEPROM can be segmented into smaller areas. Access rights 
(readable, writeable or executable) can be defined for these segments. In addition, 
access rights to Special Function Registers related to hardware components can be 
defined for code that is executed in a segment.  
Memory partitioning is fixed and can not be changed. It is determined during production 
of the TOE and is solely dependent on the MIFARE configuration (refer to section 0). 
Memory segmentation can be defined in System Mode. The segmentation is active when 
the CPU switches to User Mode. The segments, their access rights and the access rights 
to Special Function Registers related to hardware components are defined in the MMU  
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Segment Table. The MMU Segment Table stores five values for each segment: The 
memory access rights, the virtual start address of the segment, the virtual end address of 
the segment, the address offset for the segment and the access rights to Special 
Function Registers for code that is executed in the segment. The address offset is used 
to relocate the segment anywhere in the memory map. The resulting address computed 
by the Memory Management Unit can not overrule memory partitioning. Up to 64 
segments can be defined in the MMU Segment Table. Special configurations of the 
memory access rights allow to specify less than 64 segments and to split the MMU 
Segment Table into several parts being stored at different locations in memory.  
Note that the MMU Segment Table itself is stored in the memory and therefore the table 
itself can be placed in a segment accessible in User Mode.  
In addition, SF.MEM_ACC permanently checks whether accessed addresses point to 
physically implemented memory. Access to forbidden memory addresses in User Mode 
and accesses outside the boundaries of the physical memory are notified by raising an 
exception.  
As stated above the Memory Management Unit handles access rights to Special 
Function Registers related to hardware components for code running in User Mode. This 
information is used by SF.SFR_ACC to grant or block a certain access. The access 
rights can be defined for up to 16 groups of Special Function Registers, which are related 
to 16 hardware components. SF.SFR_ACC receives the access rights to these 16 
groups from the Memory Management Unit as well for the other CPU modes. In Boot 
Mode, Test Mode and System Mode the Memory Management Unit indicates full access 
to the 16 groups. In MIFARE Mode the Memory Management Unit indicates access 
rights as set in two Special Function Registers, which can not be modified in MIFARE 
Mode. Thus, MIFARE Mode can be restricted in its access to the 16 hardware 
components on demand of the Security IC Embedded Software. Note that SF.MEM_ACC 
only provides the access rights to SF.SFR_ACC, the access control is enforced by 
SF.SFR_ACC.   
SF.SFR_ACC: Special Function Register Access Control 
SF.SFR_ACC controls access to the Special Function Registers and CPU mode 
switches based on Special Function Register PSWH.  
SF.SFR_ACC implements access control to the Special Function Registers as specified 
in the Access Control Policy and the Security Functional Requirements 
FDP_ACC.1[SFR] and FDP_ACF.1[SFR]. 
The function of the Special Function Register and the CPU mode determine, whether 
read and/or write access to a Special Function Register is allowed or not. For example, 
read access to the DES key register is write-only according to its function and its write 
access is granted depending on the CPU mode. Similar for the output register of the 
Random Number Generator, which is read-only based on its function, and read access is 
granted based on the CPU mode.  
SF.SFR_ACC ignores accesses to Special Function Registers, which are not allowed. 
Ignoring means that a write access has no influence and/or a read access always returns 
a fixed value independent of the true value of the Special Function Register.  
Some Special Function Registers are implemented threefold, one for User Mode, a 
second one for System Mode and a third one for Super System Mode meaning Boot 
Mode, Test Mode and MIFARE Mode. Hence, such Special Function Registers are 
already separated from the outset.   
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SF.SFR_ACC relies on access rights to Special Function Registers related to hardware 
components, which are provided by SF.MEM_ACC. Access rights to all other Special 
Function Registers are pre-defined and can not be changed.  
This implies that code running in User Mode or MIFARE Mode is not able to use 
SS.RNG, SS.HW_DES, and SS.HW_AES until access to the respective group of Special 
Function Registers is explicitly granted by code running in System Mode. This holds for 
all 16 hardware components, which are controlled by the 16 groups of Special Function 
Registers related to hardware components.  
SF.SFR_ACC also implements transitions among CPU modes based on Special 
Function Register PSWH. This Special Function Register contains two bits, which are 
PSWH.SSM and PSWH.SM. Bit PSWH.SSM indicates Super System Mode when set, 
which means, that one out of Boot Mode, Test Mode and MIFARE Mode is active. Bit 
PSWH.SM indicates System Mode when set. If both bits are zero, the CPU operates in 
User Mode. 
The CPU mode changes by the following operations.  
·  Call of a system call vector (SVEC) address or a configuration vector (CVEC) 
address. A call of a SVEC sets bit PSWH.SM and enables System Mode, a call of a 
CVEC sets bit PSWH.SSM and enables MIFARE Mode. Calls of SVEC addresses 
are only allowed in User Mode, otherwise an exception is raised. For P5CC081V1A 
calls to the CVEC addresses do not set bit PSWH.SSM. Instead, the call is executed 
like any other call.  
·  Execution of an exception or interrupt. Any event that leads to the execution of an 
exception sets bit PSWH.SM. Interrupts can be executed in User Mode or in System 
Mode. The Security IC Embedded Software running in System Mode can configure 
this option at run time and based on this configuration bit PSWH.SM is modified or 
not.  
·  Return from an exception/interrupt or vector call with a RETI instruction. This 
restores the value of PSWH to the value before the event occurred. A RETI in User 
Mode is allowed only in case interrupts are allowed to be executed in User Mode and 
an interrupt is actually active, otherwise an exception is raised.  
·  Execution of an LCALL/ACALL/ECALL instruction to a specific address. A call of 
address 0x800000 in System Mode enables User Mode and starts execution at this 
(virtual) address. This is similar to a CVEC or SVEC call, but no return address is 
pushed onto the stack. 
·  Direct modification of the two bits in PSWH. Hardware provided by SF.SFR_ACC 
ensures that the bits can only be cleared. Therefore it is not possible for code 
running in User Mode to enter System Mode, but System Mode can switch to User 
Mode.  
Two CPU modes are available to the Security IC Embedded Software, which are System 
Mode and User Mode. System Mode is the more privileged CPU mode since it allows 
access to all Special Function Registers of the hardware components and for system 
management (i.e. configuration of Memory Management Unit, clock settings and some 
mechanisms provided by SF.LOG). User Mode is the less privileged, but with regard to 
the hardware components it can be made as powerful as System Mode.  
SF.SFR_ACC and SF.COMP together ensure that other CPU modes are not available to 
the Security IC Embedded Software, but reserved for specific purposes fulfilled by the IC 
Dedicated Software. In addition, SF.MEM_ACC provides separation of the memories and 
access control information.  
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7.2  TOE Summary Specification Rationale 
7.2.1  Rationale for the portions of the TOE security functionality 
The following table provides a mapping of portions of the TOE security functionality to the 
Security Functional Requirements. The mapping is described in detail in the text 
following the table only in the full verison of the Security Target.  
Table 20.  Mapping of Security Functional Requirements and the portions of the TOE 
Security Functionality 
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FAU_SAS.1          X    X     
FCS_RNG.1  X        X         
FDP_IFC.1          X  X       
FDP_ITT.1          X  X       
FMT_LIM.1          X    X     
FMT_LIM.2          X    X     
FPT_FLS.1        X  X         
FPT_ITT.1          X  X       
FPT_PHP.3          X         
FRU_FLT.2        X  X         
FCS_COP.1[DES]    X      X         
FCS_COP.1[AES]      X    X         
FDP_ACC.1[MEM]          X      X   
FDP_ACC.1[SFR]          X        X 
FDP_ACF.1[MEM]          X      X   
FDP_ACF.1[SFR]          X        X 
FMT_MSA.1[MEM]          X      X   
FMT_MSA.1[SFR]          X        X 
FMT_MSA.3[MEM]          X      X   
FMT_MSA.3[SFR]          X        X 
FMT_SMF.1          X      X  X 
 
An "X" in the above table means that the specific portion of the TOE security functionality 
realises or supports the functionality required by the respective Security Functional 
Requirement. 
As already stated in the definition of the portions of the TOE security functionality there 
are additional security mechanisms, which can contribute to security when they are 
sufficiently controlled by the Security IC Embedded Software. The CRC calculation can 
be used to verify the integrity of memory areas defined by the Security IC Embedded 
Software, the FameXE coprocessor can be used to build leakage-resistant asymmetric 
cryptographic algorithms.  
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7.2.2  Security architectural information 
Since this Security Target claims the assurance requirement ASE_TSS.2 security 
architectural information on a very high level is supposed to be included in the TSS to 
inform potential customers on how the TOE protects itself against interference, logical 
tampering and bypass. In the security architecture context, this covers the aspects self-
protection and non-bypassability. 
As described in section 7.2.1, the aspects self-protection and non-bypassability are 
implemented by SF.PHY, SF.OPC, and SF.COMP.  
SF.PHY covers the physical protection of the TOE. SF.OPC contributes by covering the 
aspects failure with preservation of secure state and limited fault tolerance. SF.COMP 
limits capability and availability of the Test Features.   
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8.  Annexes 
8.1  Further Information contained in the PP 
Chapter 7 of the PP “Security IC Platform Protection Profile” [6] provides further 
information. Section 7.1 in [6] describes the development and production process of 
Security ICs including a detailed life-cycle description and a description of the assets of 
the IC Designer/Manufacturer. Section 7.2 in [6] comprises security aspects of the 
Security IC Embedded Software, i.e further information regarding A.Resp-Appl and 
examples of specific Functional Requirements for the Security IC Embedded Software. 
Section 7.3 in [6] gives examples of Attack Scenarios.  
8.2  Glossary and Vocabulary  
Administrator  (in the sense of the Common Criteria) The TOE may 
provide security functionality which can or need to be 
administrated (i) by the Security IC Embedded 
Software or (ii) using services of the TOE after 
delivery to Phases 4-6. Then a privileged user (in the 
sense of the Common Criteria, refer to definition 
below) becomes an administrator. 
Application Data   All data managed by the Security IC Embedded 
Software in the application context. Application data 
comprise all data in the final Security IC.  
Boot Mode  CPU mode of the TOE dedicated to start-up and 
reset of the TOE. This mode is not accessible for the 
Security IC Embedded Software. 
Composite Product   Integrator Role installing or finalising the IC 
Embedded Software and the applications on platform 
transforming the TOE into the unpersonalised 
Composite Product after TOE delivery  
The TOE Manufacturer may implement IC Embedded 
Software delivered by the Security IC Embedded 
Software Developer before TOE delivery (e.g. if the 
IC Embedded Software is implemented in ROM or is 
stored in the non-volatile memory as service provided 
by the IC Manufacturer or IC Packaging 
Manufacturer).  
Composite Product Manufacturer  The Composite Product Manufacturer has the 
following roles (i) the Security IC Embedded Software 
Developer (Phase 1), (ii) the Composite Product 
Integrator (Phase 5) and (iii) the Personaliser (Phase 
6). If the TOE is delivered after Phase 3 in form of 
wafers or sawn wafers (dice) he has the role of the IC 
Packaging Manufacturer (Phase 4) in addition.  
The customer of the TOE Manufacturer, who receives 
the TOE during TOE Delivery. The Composite 
ProducT Manufacturer includes the Security IC 
Embedded Software developer and all roles after  
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TOE Delivery up to Phase 6 (refer to [6], Figure 2 on 
page 240H10 and Section 7.1.1)  
CPU mode  Mode in which the CPU operates. The TOE supports 
five CPU modes, which are Boot Mode, Test Mode, 
MIFARE Mode, System Mode and User Mode.  
exception interrupt  Non-maskable interrupt of program execution 
jumping to fixed addresses (depending on the 
exception source) and enabling System Mode. 
Sources of exceptions are hardware breakpoints, 
single fault injection detections, illegal instructions, 
stack overflows, unauthorised system call vector 
calls, execution of RETI instruction in User Mode, and 
the MMU exceptions access violation and access 
collision. 
FabKey Area  A memory area in the EEPROM containing data, 
which are programmed during testing by the IC 
Manufacturer. The amount of data and the type of 
information can be selected by the customer. 
IC Dedicated Software  IC proprietary software embedded in a Security IC 
(also known as IC firmware) and developed by the IC 
Developer. Such software is required for testing 
purpose (IC Dedicated Test Software) but may 
provide additional services to facilitate usage of the 
hardware and/or to provide additional services (IC 
Dedicated Support Software). 
IC Dedicated Support Software  That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to 
above) which provides functions after TOE Delivery. 
The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated Software 
might be restricted to certain phases. 
IC Dedicated Test Software  That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to 
above) which is used to test the TOE before TOE 
Delivery but which does not provide any functionality 
thereafter. 
End-consumer   User of the Composite Product in Phase 7 
Initialisation Data   Initialisation Data defined by the TOE Manufacturer to 
identify the TOE and to keep track of the Security IC’s 
production and further life-cycle phases are 
considered as belonging to the TSF data. These data 
are for instance used for traceability and for TOE 
identification (identification data). 
Integrated Circuit (IC)   Electronic component(s) designed to perform 
processing and/or memory functions. 
Memory  IC hardware component, that stores code and/or 
data, i.e. ROM, RAM or EEPROM of the TOE.  
Memory Management Unit  The MMU maps the virtual addresses used by the 
CPU into the physical addresses of RAM, ROM and 
EEPROM. This mapping is done based on (a)  
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memory partitioning and (b) memory segments for 
code running in User Mode. Memory partitioning is 
fixed, whereas up to 64 memory segments can be 
configured individually. Each segment can be (i) 
positioned and sized (ii) enabled and disabled, (iii) 
configured for access rights in terms of read, write 
and execute in User Mode and (iv) configured for 
User Mode access rights to Special Function 
Registers related to hardware components of code 
executed in this segment.  
Memory Segment  Address space provided by the Memory Management 
Unit according to the configuration in the MMU 
Segment Table. A memory segment defines a 
memory area, are accessible for code running in User 
Mode. Memory segments may address RAM, ROM 
and EEPROM. 
MIFARE  Contactless smartcard interface standard complying 
with ISO/IEC 14443 A. 
MIFARE Mode  CPU mode of the TOE dedicated to execution of the 
MIFARE Operating System, which is part of the IC 
Dedicated Support Software. This mode is not 
accessible for the Security IC Embedded Software. 
MMU Segment Table  This structure defines the memory segments for code 
running in User Mode, which are controlled by the 
MMU. The structure can be located anywhere in the 
memory that is available in System Mode. It also 
contains User Mode access rights to Special Function 
Registers related to hardware components of code 
executed in each segment.  
Pre-personalisation Data   Any data supplied by the Card Manufacturer that is 
injected into the non-volatile memory by the 
Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 3). These 
data are for instance used for traceability and/or to 
secure shipment between phases. 
S²C  Smart card interface standard complying with 
ISO/IEC 18092.  
Security IC   (as used in the PP [6]) Composition of TOE, Security 
IC Embedded Software, User Data and package 
(Security IC carrier).  
Security IC Embedded Software   Software embedded in a Security IC and normally not 
being developed by the IC Designer. The Security IC 
Embedded Software is designed in Phase 1 and 
embedded into the Security IC in Phase 3 or in later 
phases of the Security IC product life-cycle.  
Some part of that software may actually implement a 
Security IC application others may provide standard 
services. Nevertheless, this distinction does not 
matter here so that the Security IC Embedded  
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Software can be considered as being application 
dependent whereas the IC Dedicated Software is 
definitely not. 
Security IC Product   Composite product which includes the Security 
Integrated Circuit (i.e. the TOE) and the Embedded 
Software and is evaluated as composite target of 
evaluation in the sense of the Supporting Document 
Security Rows  Top-most 128 bytes of the EEPROM memory 
reserved for configuration purposes as well as 
dedicated memory area for the Security IC 
Embedded Software to store life-cycle information 
about the TOE. 
Special Function Registers  Registers used to access and configure the functions 
for communication with an external interface device, 
the cryptographic coprocessors for Triple-DES or 
AES, the FameXE coprocessor for basic arithmetic 
functions to perform asymmetric cryptographic 
algorithms, the random numbers generator and chip 
configuration. 
Super System Mode  This term represents either Boot Mode, Test Mode or 
MIFARE Mode. 
System Mode  CPU mode of the TOE with unrestricted access to the 
hardware resources. The Memory Management Unit 
can be configured in System Mode. 
Test Features   All features and functions (implemented by the IC 
Dedicated Test Software and/or hardware) which are 
designed to be used before TOE Delivery only and 
delivered as part of the TOE. 
Test Mode  CPU mode of the TOE for its configuration and 
execution of the IC Dedicated Test Software. The 
Test Mode is permanently and irreversible disabled 
after production testing. Specific Special Function 
Registers are accessible in Test Mode for test 
purposes. 
TOE Delivery   The period when the TOE is delivered which is (refer 
to [6], Figure 2 on page 242H10) either (i) after Phase 
3 (or before Phase 4) if the TOE is delivered in form 
of wafers or sawn wafers (dice) or (ii) after Phase 4 
(or before Phase 5) if the TOE is delivered in form of 
packaged products.  
TOE Manufacturer   The TOE Manufacturer must ensure that all 
requirements for the TOE (as defined in [6], Section 
243H1.2.2) and its development and production 
environment are fulfilled (refer to [6], Figure 2 on 
page 24H10).  
The TOE Manufacturer has the following roles: (i) IC 
Developer (Phase 2) and (ii) IC Manufacturer (Phase  
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3). If the TOE is delivered after Phase 4 in form of 
packaged products, he has the role of the (iii) IC 
Packaging Manufacturer (Phase 4) in addition. 
TSF data   Data created by and for the TOE, which might affect 
the operation of the TOE. This includes information 
about the TOE’s configuration, if any is coded in non-
volatile non-programmable memories (ROM), in 
specific circuitry, in non-volatile programmable 
memories (for instance EEPROM) or a combination 
thereof. 
User  (in the sense of the Common Criteria) The TOE 
serves as a platform for the Security IC Embedded 
Software. Therefore, the “user” of the TOE (as used 
in the Common Criteria assurance class AGD: 
guidance) is the Security IC Embedded Software. 
Guidance is given for the Security IC Embedded 
Software Developer. 
  On the other hand the Security IC (with the TOE as a 
major element) is used in a terminal where 
communication is performed through the ISO/IEC 
interface provided by the TOE. Therefore, another 
“user” of the TOE is the terminal (with its software). 
User Data   All data managed by the Security IC Embedded 
Software in the application context. User data 
comprise all data in the final Security IC except the 
TSF data.  
User Mode  CPU mode of the TOE. Access to memories is 
controlled by the Memory Management Unit. Access 
to Special Function Registers is restricted.  
8.3  List of Abbreviations 
CC  Common Criteria Version 3.1 
CIU  Contactless Interface Unit 
CPU  Central Processing Unit 
DEA  Data Encryption Algorithm 
DES  Data Encryption Standard 
DRNG  Deterministic Random Number Generator 
EAL  Evaluation Assurance Level 
ECC  Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
IC  Integrated circuit 
IT  Information Technology 
MMU  Memory Management Unit 
MX  Memory eXtension 
NDA  Non Disclosure Agreement  
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NFC  Near Field Communication 
PKC  Public Key Cryptography 
PP  Protection Profile 
PSWH  Program Status Word (High byte) 
SAR  Security Assurance Requirement 
SFR  as abbreviation of the CC term: Security Functional 
Requirement, as abbreviation of the technical term of the 
SmartMX-family: Special Function Register
45 
SIM  Subscriber Identity Module 
SOF  Strength of Function 
SF                  Security Feature  
SS                Security Service  
ST  Security Target 
TOE  Target of Evaluation 
TRNG  True Random Number Generator 
TSC  TSF Scope of Control 
TSF  TOE Security Functionality 
TSFI  TSF Interface  
TSP  TOE Security Policy 
UART  Universal Asynchronous Receiver and Transmitter 
 
45   To avoid confusion this Security Target does not use SFR as abbreviation for Special Function 
Register in the explanatory text. However, the abbreviation is used in objective or security 
functionality identifiers and to distinguish iterations.   
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10. Legal information
10.1  Definitions 
Draft — The document is a draft version only. The content is still under 
internal review and subject to formal approval, which may result in 
modifications or additions. NXP Semiconductors does not give any 
representations or warranties as to the accuracy or completeness of 
information included herein and shall have no liability for the consequences 
of use of such information. 
10.2  Disclaimers 
General — Information in this document is believed to be accurate and 
reliable. However, NXP Semiconductors does not give any representations 
or warranties, expressed or implied, as to the accuracy or completeness of 
such information and shall have no liability for the consequences of use of 
such information. 
Right to make changes — NXP Semiconductors reserves the right to make 
changes to information published in this document, including without 
limitation specifications and product descriptions, at any time and without 
notice. This document supersedes and replaces all information supplied prior 
to the publication hereof. 
Suitability for use — NXP Semiconductors products are not designed, 
authorized or warranted to be suitable for use in medical, military, aircraft, 
space or life support equipment, nor in applications where failure or 
malfunction of a NXP Semiconductors product can reasonably be expected 
to result in personal injury, death or severe property or environmental 
damage. NXP Semiconductors accepts no liability for inclusion and/or use of 
NXP Semiconductors products in such equipment or applications and 
therefore such inclusion and/or use is for the customer’s own risk. 
Applications — Applications that are described herein for any of these 
products are for illustrative purposes only. NXP Semiconductors makes no 
representation or warranty that such applications will be suitable for the 
specified use without further testing or modification.  
Export control — This document as well as the item(s) described herein 
may be subject to export control regulations. Export might require a prior 
authorization from national authorities. 
10.3  Licenses 
ICs with DPA Countermeasures functionality 
 
NXP ICs containing functionality 
implementing countermeasures to 
Differential Power Analysis and Simple 
Power Analysis are produced and sold 
under applicable license from 
Cryptography Research, Inc. 
10.4  Patents 
Notice is herewith given that the subject device uses one or more of the 
following patents and that each of these patents may have corresponding 
patents in other jurisdictions. 
<Patent ID> — owned by <Company name> 
10.5  Trademarks 
Notice: All referenced brands, product names, service names and 
trademarks are property of their respective owners. 
FabKey — is a trademark of NXP B.V. 
MIFARE — is a trademark of NXP B.V. 
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